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THE PARADOX OF UNMARRIED FATHERS AND
THE CONSTITUTION: BIOLOGY 'PLUS' DEFINES
RELATIONSHIPS; BIOLOGY ALONE
SAFEGUARDS THE PUBLIC FISC
LAURA OREN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided a number
of constitutional questions concerning unmarried fathers and their
children. Whether in the context of procedural or substantive due
process or of equal protection, of 'illegitimacy' or 'gender,' these
cases reflected the Court's views of the 'natural' family from two
angles. On one hand, the Court created ajurisprudence ofthe unmarried
father's interest in a personal relationship with his child.1 These
decisions explored the nature and extent of the nonmarital father's
right to the care and custody of his child,' and the procedural and
substantive protections available to him when another man sought
to adopt his child or otherwise preclude him from having a paternal
relationship.' On the other hand, the Court also decided a number
of issues about benefits which derived through the connection
between an unmarried father and his child.4 These cases
considered a variety of questions, such as the procedural requisites
for establishing paternity involuntarily,5 formulas for 'deeming'
* Laura Oren is a Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center. This
Article is dedicated to my children, Leah and Sam.
My thanks to the University of Houston Law Foundation for financial assistance for
this project. I am grateful for research assistance from the following former students at
various stages of this, and related, projects: Nancy McAlister, Loan Huynh, Amy Yenyo,
Carolyn Cappocia, and Jennifer White.
1. See infra Part I.
2. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (addressing the presumption of unfitness of
an unmarried father).
3. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (addressing the issue of stepfather adoption);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (addressing the issue ofstepfather adoption); Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (addressing the issue of stepfather adoption); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying an adulterous biological father standing to
establish paternity of his child born into the marriage of the child's mother to another man).
4. See infra Part I.
5. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that a law denying the right of paternal
support to nonmarital children is unconstitutional); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982)
(stating that a one-year limit on a nonmarital child's right to bring a paternity suit is
unconstitutional); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (invalidating a two-year statute of
limitations); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (declaring a six.year statute of limitations
invalid); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (explaining that, under Connecticut statute,
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family income for purposes of public assistance,' or rules for
obtaining derivative citizenship through an unmarried father.'
Directly or indirectly, however, the opinions in this category all
concerned claims on the public fisc.
While the Court held that a biological connection alone
established the requisite link in benefits cases, the Court found that
something more was necessary in personal association cases, i.e.,
'biology plus.' Thus, factual biology was enough for involuntary
establishment of paternity and the consequent duty of child support;
conversely, however, a non-marital father who did not wish to be
legally displaced by another man seeking to adopt his child had to
prove the biological link plus some kind of an existing relationship.
This dichotomy in analysis creates an apparent paradox of paternity.
It also complicates the constitutional line-drawing commanded by
the personal relationship line of cases. The resulting uncertainties
make it difficult to predict the answer to an issue about which the
Court has given little guidance: the procedural and substantive
rights of a putative father of a newborn who has been thwarted in
his efforts to grasp his 'opportunity interest' and to develop a
relationship with his child.
In Part II, this article will discuss the Constitution and the
nonmarital father's personal relationship with his children. In a
series of cases ranging in subject from an issue about care and
custody of children to stepfather adoption disputes, the Court
developed a distinction between reluctant nonmarital fathers and
fathers who had stepped forward to grasp the unique opportunity
offered by biology. Even if a man enjoyed a minimal right to notice
and some kind of individualized hearing, he did not necessarily
acquire full parental rights. Instead, in order to become a father
whom the state must presume to be fit for the custody of his
children or to wield veto power if another man sought to adopt
them, an unmarried father had to satisfy a 'biology plus' standard.
In one case, however, even a man who met this threshold nonetheless
lost when he came up against what the Court called "the unitary family."'
Part III of this article considers the benefits or 'public fisc'
cases. Suits to establish paternity and claim child support belong in
this category. These ostensibly private lawsuits in fact were designed
the state must pay for blood tests for an indigent man alleged to be a father); Rivera v.
Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (declaring preponderance of the evidence sufficient as the
standard for establishing paternity).
6. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
7. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
8. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
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to recoup, from unmarried fathers, as much of the costs of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments as possible.
At the end of the day, the children often received little or no benefit.
In a changing political and statutory climate, the Court heard
cases in this public fisc category involving time limits on paternity
suits, blood test evidence, burdens of proof, and devices for calculating
household qualifications for public assistance. A citizenship case
was the most recent in a line of decisions where children sought to
derive benefits, public or private, through their parents, or parents
through their children, and it conceptually fell into the public fisc
category as well.9 Interestingly, the majority of the Court seemed to
agree that mere biology, the factual reality alone, was enough
where the issues centered on financial obligations and a welfare
collection rationale.
Part IV considers how recent trends in the biology versus
'biology plus' approaches have underscored the apparent paradox of
paternity, sometimes even in the same case. While pure biology
increasingly reigns in federal welfare 'reform' policy, state courts
and legislatures have to struggle with the 'biology plus' legacy for
personal relationship issues. Biology plus has been particularly
difficult to define in the context of the unmarried father who claims
to have been denied his 'opportunity interest' in developing a
relationship with his child through no fault of his own. By its
inaction on two notorious cases of failed adoptions in this context,
the Supreme Court provided no additional guidance for this prong
of the paradox of paternity. State courts and legislatures, therefore,
have proceeded to 'resolve' the problem of the thwarted father
through statutory devices such as putative father registries and
through judicial opinions which define the requisite 'plus' factor
with subjectivity and a focus on the degree of misbehavior involved.
In its conclusion, this article ponders the question of what
makes a man a father in a constitutional sense. The Court's answer
is, It depends' - sometimes it is mere biology, but for other purposes
'biology plus' is required. The Court generally seems satisfied to
follow the lead of legislative policy which views establishment of
biological paternity as the key to safeguarding the public fisc. When
it comes to an unwed father who is competing with another man for
a chance to protect or establish a relationship with his child,
however, biology alone does not suffice, and a 'plus' factor is required.
Jurisprudential problems exist on both sides of this paradox of
paternity. Together, they raise some very troubling questions.
9. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53.
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Both lines of cases have failed to define the constitutional
status of the thwarted putative father. What should happen to the
biological father who has not been swept up in the new wave of inhospital paternity establishment nor been precluded by the
application of a valid putative father? When biology alone cannot
prevail, and 'biology plus' is hard to establish because the man has
had no opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, the
principles that guide paternity determination remain illusive.
This article suggests that although 'justice' (and injustice) is
clearly relevant, especially with truly gross misconduct, there is no
social crisis of thwarted fathers that justifies severe results that
treat children like 'sacks of potatoes' to be handed from parent to
parent precipitously and without regard to the passage of time in
the child's life. A mother's choices or mis-choices in identifying her
child's biological father ordinarily should not provide a basis for the
later total uprooting of the child. A 'thwarted' father who is not
willing to take custody and raise his child, but wants only to
interfere with the mother's adoption placement decision, should
not acquire constitutionally protected rights to invalidate the adoption.
On the other hand, there may be more nuanced and individualized
solutions to adoptions that have been flawed by a thwarted father's
loss of an 'opportunity interest' in developing a relationship with
his child.
II: NONMARITAL FATHERS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The line-drawing with respect to a nonimarital father's right to
the enjoyment of the care and custody of his children was not clear
0 Upon the
at first. In 1972, the Court decided Stanley v. Illinois.'
death of the mother of his three children, the State of Illinois
declared Mr. Stanley's children dependent and "dismember[ed]"
his family,' without any showing that he was an unfit parent.
Illinois law provided that the children of unwed fathers automatically
became wards of the State upon the death of their mothers. 2 By
contrast, married fathers, "whether divorced, widowed or separated"
and mothers, including those who never married, enjoyed a
presumption that they were fit to raise their children."3 As to all
10.
11.
people
12.
13.

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 658. The children were placed with court-appointed guardians, the same
with whom the father had already informally placed them. Id. at 663 n.2.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
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these parents, the presumption of fitness could be overcome only
via an individualized hearing. Nonmarital fathers, like Peter Stanley,
however, had no right to any hearing. Stanley attacked this statutory
scheme on the basis that it violated his constitutional rights." The
Court concluded that "as a matter of due process of law," he was
entitled to a hearing on the question of his parental fitness before
the State removed his children. 5 The Court held that by extending
the right to such a hearing to other kinds of parents, but denying it
to Mr. Stanley, Illinois violated his equal protection rights. 16
No one disputed the fact that Joan Stanley had lived with Peter
Stanley "intermittently" over the course of eighteen years and the
birth of their three children or that they had never married. 7 The
Court's 8 portrayal of unmarried fathers in general, and of Peter
Stanley in particular, was in marked contrast to the briefs of the
State of Illinois and to the views expressed in Justice Burger's
dissent. The Court viewed Mr. Stanley as a man who had "sired and
raised" his children.19 As a result, he had a private interest which
"undeniablywarrants deference and, absentapowerfid countervailing
interest,protection," 20 derived from the line of constitutional cases
beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska.21 If the state could not deprive
a married father of his children without a showing of unfitness,
neither could the state remove children from the unmarried father
who had "sired and raised" them as Mr. Stanley had without the
same due process.' The Court rejected the statutory presumption that
unwed fathers who met the Stanley standard were perse unfit and
instead required an individualized hearing on that very issue. 2 To
the State's arguments that the unwed father could have either
adopted his children or petitioned for custody and control, the
Court replied that neither option satisfactorily protected his

14. id.; see also id. at 663 n.2 (discussing Stanley's resistance to the naming of others as
legal guardians).
15. id. at 649; see also id. at 658 (mandating a hearing when considering removal of a
father's family).
16. id. at 649.
17. Id. at 646.
18. Only seven Justices participated in considering the case, not including Justices
Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at 659. Justice Douglas did not join Part III of the majority
opinion. Id.
19. Id. at 650.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (deeming the rights to conceive
and raise one's children 'essential')).
22. Id. at 650.
23. Id. at 649.
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rights.' As a legal stranger rather than a parent, Stanley would
enjoy no priority in an adoption proceeding. Furthermore, he would
appear at a disadvantage due to his unmarried and "impecunious"
state.' The legal custody route was also inadequate because it
would not constitute recognition of his parenthood. He would always
remain a mere guardian, subject to the loss of his children without
the necessity for a neglect hearing to show him unfit.26
The State of Illinois argued that based on "history and culture"
unmarried fathers were "factually different" than married fathers,
because they were absent from the home, lacked interest in their
children, and failed to undertake responsibility for them.27 The
Court replied that even if this was true for many men, it was not
so for all unwed fathers, and, therefore, the statute could not
preempt an individualized hearing to determine the fitness of
unwed fathers like Stanley.28
By contrast, the dissent not only accepted the State of Illinois'
general characterization of unwed fathers, but was skeptical about
Mr. Stanley himself. Justice Burger opined that the State was
justified in protecting"illegitimate" children by recognizing a difference
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers.' Unwed fathers "as a
class" were not as easy to locate and identify as unwed mothers.'0
Moreover, "centuries of human experience" supported the view that
mothers care while unwed fathers generally do not. 8 Fathers who
24. Id. at 648.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 649-50.
27. Id. at 653 n.5
28. Id. at 654. See also id. at 653 n.6 (quoting the Illinois' statement concerning
disinterested putative fathers).
29. Id. at 665 (Burger, J., dissenting).
30. Id. The proof problems in Stanley's day were substantially superceded by later
developments in genetic testing and the consequent willingness of courts to accept new
kinds of evidence. D. H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Cases of
Paternity Testing, 75 IOwA L REV. 75, 77 n.9 (1989). Kaye explains that the "traditional"
evidentiary treatment in most jurisdictions "was that blood tests could be used to
disprove, but not to prove paternity, and the admissibility of newer tests - primarily
Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) typing- often was in doubt." Id. at 77 n.9 (citing Ellman
& Kaye, Probabilities and Proof Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (1979)). In the 1980s, however "the old exclusionary rule for
incriminating genetic findings... crumbled in the face of improvements in immunogenetic
testing." Id. at 78. For an influential article promoting the reliability of HLA testing, see
Paul I. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing 1000 Paternity Cases not Excluded by ABO
Testing, 16 J. FAM. L 543, 552 (1977-78). By the 1990s, it was clear that the new biological
testing (HLA and beyond) was widely accepted as determining evidence of paternity. See,eg.,
Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461,
463(1996).
31. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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do care could demonstrate that they are willing to accept legally
enforceable rights and duties by marrying the mother and
acknowledging the children as their own. An unmarried father
could also be established as a parent through a paternity suit
initiated by the mother which would make him liable for support to
the child.' In the absence of such legally established responsibilities,
however, the unwed father may be denied the same privileges that
the married father enjoys.3"
Justice Burger noted that Peter Stanley depicted himself as an
"unusual" unwed father, one who "loved, cared for, and supported
these children from the time of their birth until the death of their
mother. "' Not only did the dissent think that Illinois was not
obligated to tailor its definition of "parent" to account for such rare
cases, it doubted that Mr. Stanley was all he claimed to be.35
Apparently, after the death of the children's mother, Stanley had
confided the actual care and custody of the children to a Mr. and
Mrs. Ness."6 He made no effort to adopt or to obtain legal
guardianship of the children, but when the state instituted a
dependency proceeding, he intervened to stop it." Justice Burger
pointedly noted that "he seemed, in particular, to be concerned
with the loss of the welfare payments he would suffer as a result of
the designation of others as guardians of the children. " '
The dissent's skepticism about Mr. Stanley's motives was the
only overt cross-reference to the public fisc issue, and the majority
of the Justices apparently were unimpressed by this argument, nor
would one expect them to be responsive to it. Whether the status
quo remained or the children were removed from his care and
custody, Mr. Stanley's children would still be dependent on state
largess, unless a family could be found to adopt them.
Clearly, in Stanley, the majority rejected a stigma on a whole
class of men, unmarried fathers, whom Illinois had conclusively
presumed to be uninterested and uninvolved in the lives of their
children. While the dissent implied that without marriage, adoption, or
some other legal undertaking, men were per se reluctant fathers,
the majority cast its net more broadly. This man who had "sired
and raised"39 his children, even without the benefit of marriage,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 664,
at 666.
at 666-67.
at 667.

at 650.
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had to be dealt with as any other parent would be.4 As to those
nonmarital fathers who really were indifferent to their children,
the Court suggested that their interests could be disposed of easily
via notice served personally, by certified mail, or by publication.4
Any putative fathers who, after receiving notice, did not "promptly
respond [could] not complain if their children [were] declared
wards of the State." 2 If the putative father did respond, however,
then the state could not avoid holding an individualized hearing.4 3
Presumably, at this hearing he could establish whether he was
more than merely the biological father, that is whether he was a
father like Mr. Stanley who had "raised" as well as "sired" his
children. If so, the unmarried father was entitled to be treated the
parent whose unfitness had to be demonstrated
same as any other
44
by the State.
40. This ruling is not the same as a holding that all unmarried fathers must be
considered "parents" under state law. However, following the decisions of the 1960s and
Stanley itself, the Commissioners for the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act concluded that the
states required new legislation "because the bulk of current law on the subject of children
born out of wedlock is either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional doubt." See
Uniform Parentage Act, Prefatory Note (1973), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu
/bll/uluc_frame.htm. The Uniform Commissioners, however, believed that "many state
courts" were interpreting Stanley "overly broadly," in a manner which made "the adoption
process . . .cumbersome and insecure." Id. Following 1973, many states adopted the
significant changes in the definition of "parent" promulgated in the Uniform Parentage Act
of that year, which eliminated many of the distinctions between marital and nonmarital
children, set up rules to create a presumption of paternity, and abandoned the term
'illegitimate" in favor of "child with no presumed father." Id. According to the Uniform
Commissioners, the inspiration for their proposal may be traced to Harry D. Krause's article
A ProposedUniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TE L. REV. 829 (1966) and his "pathfinding book,"
ILLEGrITMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLIcY (1971). Id.
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Within two weeks of the Stanley decision, the Court vacated an Illinois case and
remanded it for reconsideration in light of that opinion. See Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,
405 U.S. 1051 (1972). On remand, the Illinois court had little trouble resolving the issues
in a fairly straightforward application of the Stanley distinction. See, Vanderlaan v.
Vanderlaan, 292 N.E.2d 145 (111. App. Ct. 1972) [hereinafter VanderlaanIll. Mr. Vanderlaan
fit the Stanley paradigm more closely than even Mr. Stanley. He was once married to the
mother of all three of his children. Id. at 147. But for Illinois' dedication to the abolition of
common law marriage, he no doubt would have been married to her again. Indeed, with
each birth of his two youngest children, his divorce decree was actually modified to reflect
his paternity and to modify his obligations. Id. After the last separation, and after the
mother asked him to do so, he had them all living in his home. Id. He had both legal and
actual responsibility for his children. Id. He was as close as one could be to a 'married
father,' while technically bearing the label of 'nonmarital.' He had both "sired and raised"
his children, and had clearly stepped forward to assume his obligations. The result on
remand was unsurprising. No lines needed to be drawn, and Mr. Vanderlaan clearly
could not be absolutely precluded from retaining custody of his children. Reading Stanley
to invalidate such statutory presumptions as a matter of due process and equal protection,

20041

PARADOX OF UNMARRIED FATHERS AND THE CONSTITUTION

55

The Court further explored and explicated its 'biology plus'
standard for unmarried fathers and their personal associations with
their children in a series of stepfather adoption cases.4" In each of
these cases, the mother of the child stayed in place and indeed, the
child's home was not in question. In 1978 and 1979, the Court
decided Quilloinv. Walcott46 and Cabanv. Mohammed.4" Reaching
due process and equal protection claims, the Court filled in the
outlines of the distinction it had made between the reluctant
biological father who failed to step forward and the nonmarital
father who did grasp the unique opportunity presented by biology.
The Court subsequently approved a "solution" for the uncertainties
consequent on such an indeterminate line in Lehr v. Robertson,48 in
which it upheld New York State's putative father registry.
Leon Quilloin had neither married the mother of his child nor
established a home with them.4 9 When his son was less than three
years old, his mother married another man.' The stepfather eventually
sought to adopt the boy, who was then eleven years old.5 1 Mr.
Quilloin moved to block the adoption, even though a Georgia statute
denied nonmarital fathers that veto right unless they legitimated
their children.52 Finding that it was not "in the best interest of the
child," the Georgia courts refused to allow Quilloin to legitimate
his child, and thus to acquire the veto right he sought.5 Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Georgia
statute, as applied in this case, violated neither equal protection nor
due process54 because the putative father had never "had, or
sought, actual or legal custody of his child," 5 had notice of the
proposed adoption, and had a legitimization hearing," and because
the proposed adoption would not "place the child with a new set of
parents with whom the child had never before lived."57
the state appeals court found that the unwed father was eligible to vie for custody. Id.
45. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
46. 434 U.S. 246.
47. 441 U.S. 380.
48. 463 U.S. 248.
49. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 249.
52. Id. at 248-49; see also id. at 248-49 n.2-3 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-403(1), (2), (3)
(1975)).
53. Id. at 254.
54. Id. at 256.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id. at 253-54.
57. Id. at 255.
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To arrive at this conclusion, the Court briefly grappled with
Stanley,58 which, the Quilloin Court opined, had held "that the
State of Illinois was barred, as a matter of both due process and
equal protection, from taking custody of the children of an unwed
father, absent a hearing and a particularized finding that the
father was an unfit parent." s Stanley found "a father's interest in
the 'companionship, care, custody, and management" ofhis children to
be "'cognizable and substantial.' The earlier decision, however,
"left unresolved" the rights of the unwed father who was not unfit,
in a case "in which the countervailing interests are more substantial."
The trial court apparently found that Mr. Quilloin had not
abandoned the child.62 The child visited him intermittently and
Mr. Quilloin gave him gifts; however, the mother had become
concerned that these contacts were disruptive for the child and for
her whole family.' The child himself, although wishing to keep
contact with his biological father," wanted the adoption to go
through and wished to assume his stepfather's name."
Because the trial court denied legitimization based solely on a
finding of "best interests of [the] child,'" and then denied the
putative father standing to block the adoption, Mr. Quilloin
complained that he could not be shut out in this way without a
showing that he was unfit.' While the Court easily acknowledged
that the due process clause would be offended if the state sundered
a recognized parental relationship merely on the basis of "best
interest of the child" without a showing of unfitness, this case was
different."7 The distinction was three-fold: this father never "had, or
58. Id. at 247-48 (discussing Stanley, 405 U.S. 645).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 248.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 251.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 251 n.11.
65. Id. at 251. Despite this observation, the Court has never recognized any
constitutionally-based right enjoyed by a child to a relationship with certain adults. See,
e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (rejecting such a due process
argument, the Court has never ruled on whether a child has a liberty interest in the
relationship, symmetrical with a parent's); cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 89-90 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that invalidating a statute that allows visitation to any
person on grounds that it infringes parental rights does not take into account
circumstances in which the child might have an interest in maintaining a relationship
with a certain person).
66. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251 (alteration in original).
67. Id. at 255; cf. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) ("failure to give [the
divorced father] notice of the pending [stepfather] adoption proceedings violated the most
rudimentary demands of due process of law."). The Manzos had alleged that for the two
years preceding their motion, Mr. Armstrong failed to support his child in a manner
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sought, actual or legal custody of his [daughter]"; the stepparent
adoption would not serve to break up a pre-existing family unit; and
"the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to
a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned,
except [Mr. Quilloin]."
The equal protection challenge to the disparate treatment of
married and unmarried fathers was to no avail. The Court presumed
that a married father who now lived apart from his children,
nonetheless had some period of responsibility for care and custody
during the pendency of the marriage.70 It emphasized, however,
that Mr. Quilloin never sought any such responsibility, not even
legal custody. 1 "Under any standard of review," therefore, the
Court found Georgia's distinction defensible.7"
The next term, in Caban v. Mohammed,73 the Court took on a
New York statute that allowed a stepfather to adopt his wife's
nonmarital child without the consent of the biological father.7 4
Unlike Quilloin,however, this was a facial challenge to the statute
itself, and the Court reached the gender equality issue reserved in
the earlier case.75 The majority opinion made much more explicit
the distinction between the nonmarital father who steps forward
and the reluctant father.76 Under the statute, the unmarried mother
"commensurate with his financial ability." Id, at 546. Pursuant to Texas law, if proven
against Mr. Armstrong, this circumstance would eliminate the need to obtain his written
consent to the stepfather adoption. Id. Mr. Armstrong never knew that the proceeding was
pending until after its completion, when Mr. Manzo told him what had happened. Id. at 548.
The natural father then filed to have the stepfather's adoption set aside. Id. Although the
district court afforded him a factual hearing on that set-aside, it denied him relief. Id. at
549. He then appealed, urging, among other grounds, that the failure to set aside a decree
entered in the first instance without any notice to him "deprived him 'of his child without
due process of law.- Id. at 549. This issue went to the Supreme Court. The Court found that
"as to the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt, where, as here, the result
of the judicial proceeding was permanently to deprive a legitimate parent of all that
parenthood implies." Id. at 550. Nothing could cure that initial failure of notice, not even
the after-the-fact hearing on the set-aside, because in that proceeding the initial burden of
persuasion had changed from the Manzos to Mr. Armstrong himself. Id. at 551. Thus, the
Texas court's judgment was vacated, the status quo ante restored, and the case remanded
for further action. Id. at 552.
68. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
69. Id. at 255.
70. Id. at 256.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
74. See, N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §111 (McKinney 1976-1977).
75. Compare Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253 n.13 (issue not presented in jurisdictional
statement, therefore not addressed by Court), with Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7 (expressly
rejecting gender-based distinction of unwed parents).
76. Caban,441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
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had an absolute right to veto consent to the adoption of her
children, while the unmarried father, even though he had an
established relationship with them, had a right to be heard, but
could not block an adoption.7" With the consent of his wife, the
stepfather Mr. Mohammed could adopt her two children while the
nonmarital, biological father, Mr. Caban, could only contest on the
grounds that it was not in "the best interests of the child [ren]" even
if he was a perfectly fit father.7 8
Abdiel Caban lived with Maria Mohammed in New York City
from September 1968 through the end of 1973. 7' Although they
apparently held themselves out as married, legally they could not
be a married couple. 0 In every other respect, Mr. Caban functioned
as a father to his two children: his name was on their birth
certificates,"1 he lived with them and their mother as a family unit
until the separation in 1973,2 and he contributed to their support. 3
A month after Maria left Abdiel, she married Kazim Mohammed."
Even after the marriage, their father continued to see the children
at their maternal grandmother's house on a weekly basis.8" When
she returned to her home in Puerto Rico nine months later, the
grandmother took the children with her, at the request of the
Mohammeds, 8' who planned to retrieve them as soon as their
fledgling business got off the ground in New York City."7 Mr. Caban
visited Puerto Rico in November 1975, ostensibly to spend some
time with the children." Instead, he returned to New York City
with them, and their mother was unable to get police assistance
to get them back.89 She then filed proceedings which initially gave
her temporary custody and him visiting rights." The subsequent
77. Id. at 386-87.
78. Id. at 387.
79. Id. at 382.
80. Their marriage was not valid because New York is not a common-law marriage
state. See, e.g., People v. Vespucci, 745 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (2002) ("claimling to have a
common law marriage, a concept not recognized in New York state."). Moreover Caban
was married to someone else the whole time he lived with Mohammed, which would make
the second relationship a void marriage. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
81. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382 (noting that the children, born in 1969 and 1971, bore his
last name).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 383.
89. Id
90. Id.
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hearing, however, resulted in a stepfather adoption which entirely
cut off Mr. Caban's "parental rights and obligations."
In the Supreme Court, the New York scheme fell to a genderbased equal protection challenge.' Using the intermediate standard
for such gender-based classifications that the Court had embraced
in 1976, 93 the majority found that the distinction in the consent to
adoption law between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers
did not bear the required "substantial relation to some important
state interest."94 The Court did not accept the argument that unwed
fathers could never be as close to their older children as were
unwed mothers.9" Indeed, the Justices found that the facts of this
case amply refuted that stereotypical generalization. 6 The other
justification offered by the state also failed: the distinction between
unmarried mothers and fathers is "substantially related to the
state's interest in promoting.

..

adoption[s]." 97 Interestingly, this

seemingly more substantial and practical argument also received
short shrift. In each case, the "'over-broad generalizations'" ' were
undermined by the Court's gloss on Quilloinas containing a critical
distinction between reluctant putative fathers, and those who have
come forward and have a substantial relationship with their children:"
In those cases where the father never has come forward to
participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal
Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from
him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child .... But

in cases such as this, where the father has established a substantial
relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a
state should have no difficulty in identifying the father even of
children born out of wedlock. Thus, no showing has been made
91. Id. at 383-84. Mr. Caban's cross-petition to adopt was denied because it failed to
satisfy the statutory requirement of consent by the biological mother. Id.
92. In order to reach this result, the Court had to effectively overrule their previous
decision in Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976), which involved the same statute. In
Orsini, there was no opinion, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of a substantial federal
question. Caban,411 U.S. at 390, n. 9. Although such dismissals are entitled to precedential
value, the Court often affords them less deference because of the absence of a full review.
93. See, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197 (1976) (stating that a gender-based distinction
in drinking age was not "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives").
94. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388.
95. Id. at 389 (explaining that the children were 4 and 6 at time of the adoption
proceedings). The issue of newborn adoptions was reserved. Id. at 392 n. 11.
96. Id. at 389. ("We reject, therefore, the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction
of §111 is required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development.").
97. Id. at 389.
98. Id. at 394.
99. Id. at 389 n.7, 393 n.14.
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that the different treatment afforded unmarried fathers and
unmarried mothers under §111 bears a substantial relationship
to the proclaimed interest of the State in promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children."°
In other words, all unmarried fathers are not alike, (even if all
unmarried mothers are assumed to care about and be connected to
their children). For putative fathers who step forward, the state
cannot deny them the right to block an adoption of their children or
impose the loss of all parental relationship on them based merely
on a showing of the 'best interest of the child.' Others, however,
are reluctant, and their fate is not entirely clear in Justice Powell's
opinion.'' The unmarried mother in this case and the unmarried
father who has a relationship with his children are similarly
situated and may not be treated differently under New York
law." 2 The Court founded its opinion on gender classifications,
not reaching either the equal protection distinction between
unmarried and married fathers, or the substantive due process
claim that a state may never terminate parental rights without a
finding of parental unfitness.' 0 3
The dissenters, however, insisted that men and women were
different.' They were concerned about the impact on adoption,
especially involving newborn or very young children." The
differences for those children were manifold: "Only the mother
carries the child; it is she who has the constitutional right to decide
whether to bear it or not.""° Indeed, at birth, the mother may be
the only one who knows who the father is, and she can conceal that
fact from him, if she chooses.1 " She is together with the child
during the birth and immediately thereafter; her identity is
obvious," 8 but the father may always be an unknown.' The
consequence of these differences is that unmarried mothers have
to make immediate decisions about adoption on their own. Unmarried
fathers may marry the mothers and gain full rights; otherwise,
they may attempt to show it is in the best interest of the child for
100. Id. at 392-93 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 394.
102. Id. at 391-92.
103. Id. at 394 n.16; cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,72-73 (2000) (concluding that the
parent has the substantive right to decide with whom his or her child has contact).
104. Caban, 441 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 405.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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adoption of their children to be denied, but they should not be able
to interfere with a 'streamlined' adoption system with all the very
important interests it represents. " 0 For fear of interfering with this
more common newborn scenario, the dissenters rejected the majority's
invalidation of the whole general rule in the New York statute."'
They were even willing to apply New York's rule to older children
men and women generally were
because they were persuaded that112
different in that situation as well.
In Lehr v. Robertson,"' the last of the official series of stepfather
adoption cases, Justice Stevens, the dissenter in Caban,wrote an
opinion for the Court upholding New York State's shortcut solution
to the problem of putative fathers and adoption."" The Court
permitted New York State to terminate whatever inchoate interests
were possessed by unmarried fathers who failed to place their
names on the putative father registry."- Rejecting due process and
equal protection claims alike,"' the Court expanded on its distinction
between the reluctant father and the father who grasps the opportunity
biology gives him and develops a relationship with his child." 7
Lorraine Robertson was not married when her daughter was
born in November of 1976.18 Although Jonathan Lehr lived with
Lorraine before the birth, and visited her in the hospital, his name
did not appear on the baby's birth certificate."' He did not live with
the mother and child after the birth, provide financial support, or
offer to marry the mother. 2 ' Finally, he had not been adjudicated
the father, nor had he entered his name in the state's putative
Within eight months of the birth, Lorraine
father registry.'
110. Id. at 407-08.
111. Id. at 411-12.
112. Id. at 412 n.20
113. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
114. New York State's putative father registry law was enacted in 1976 and amended
in 1979. See, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2003). The Lehr dispute arose before
the Court's final decision in Caban. Lehr, 463 at 254 n.7. The New York appellate court
ruled that Caban was not to be applied retroactively. Lehr, 463 at 253-54.
115. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248-49.
118. Id. at 250.
117. Id. at 261-62.
118. Id. at 250.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 248. Lehr claimed that he and the mother had lived together for some time
before the child's birth and that he offered financial aid to the mother and stepfather
afterwards. Id. at 269.
121. Id. at 251. The New York statute also provided that the following persons would be
entitled to notice: (1) a person adjudicated to be the father; (2) a person identified as
father on birth certificate; (3) a person who lived openly with child and child's mother and
held himself out as the child's parent; (4) a person who has been identified as the father by
the mother in a sworn written statement; or (5) a person who was married to the child's
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married another man, Mr. Robertson, who subsequently sought to
adopt her daughter, unbeknownst to Mr. Lehr.'22 Still in the dark
about the adoption proceeding in the Ulster County Court, the
putative father filed an action in Westchester for the determination
of paternity and for visitation rights. 1" Subsequently, the Ulster
County judge entered the adoption judgment without notice to Mr.
Lehr, even after learning of the pending paternity suit.124 The judge
believed that notice to Mr. Lehr was not required."2 The putative
father first complained to the United States Supreme Court that
this sequence of events, and the statute which allowed it to occur,
deprived him of a liberty interest protected under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Secondly, he argued
the statute's interpretation constituted gender-based discrimination
in violation of12the
Equal Protection Clause, and he sought to vacate
7
the adoption.
For the first time since Stanley, the Court closely examined the
nature of the liberty interest at stake. It embraced and elaborated
the due process position of the four dissenters in Caban.l " The
paradigm of the reluctant father became fixed in constitutional
jurisprudence. According to the Court, while the line of cases
beginning with Meyer and Pierce established that parents have a
protected relationship with their children, it also established that
this was a function "of the responsibilities they have assumed."'2 9
The rights of nonmarital fathers in particular were limned in
"precisely three cases": Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban."' These were
the putative fathers whose fates set the stage for the Court's
ultimate conclusion in Lehr:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the

responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate
in the rearing of his child," his interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause. At that point, it may be said that he "act[s] as a father
mother before the child was six months old. id. at 251-52 n.5.
122. Id. at 250.
123. Id. at 252-53.
124. Id. at 253.
125. Id. at 253 (finding that the adoption had the effect of terminating the Ulster County
paternity suit).
126. Id. at 255.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 257-62 (claiming to be at liberty to do this because the earlier decision was
based on equal protection and the majority allegedly did not address due process claims).
129. Id. at 257.

130. Id. at 258.
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toward his children." But the mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.13'

The biological relationship alone could not create a strongly
protected interest. Rather, its significance was "that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring."132 After that, it is up to
him; a putative father may either grasp the opportunity and
responsibility of parenthood, and gain parental standing, or not.'33
If he does not, if he is a reluctant father, then the Constitution will
not force the state to afford him any greater protection than it chooses.' 34
The Court found that Mr. Lehr did not grasp his opportunity
in any of the ample ways provided by New York State; therefore,
the Court did not recognize any special relationship.' The State's
putative registry scheme, which required Mr. Lehr merely to mail
in a postcard if he wanted notice, was not arbitrary, and this

standard was all that was called for under these circumstances. 13 6
Even the actual knowledge of the adoption court that Mr. Lehr was
concurrently seeking to establish his paternity did not alter the
Court's conclusion that Lehr was not entitled to notice of the
adoption." 7 Nor did the majority find that there was any
significant difference in this regard between a stepfather adoption,
as in this case, and a stranger adoption. 38 Indeed it was easier to
justify this situation on a pure "best interest of the child" standard
and to keep intact what already amounted to a functional family. l 9
The due process argument in Lehr prefigured the equal protection
rationale: since this case involved a reluctant father, who had not
come forward to grasp his opportunity, he could not be similarly
situated with the mother. 140 Thus, the Court disposed of genderbased equal protection with dispatch, leaving no need to discuss
the difficulties of the intermediate standard of review. Moreover,
131. Id. at 261 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 262.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 264-65.
136. Id. at 264. The purpose of the putative registry law, according to the Court, is to
"dispel uncertainties" by giving clear guidance for who gets notice. Id. It provides to unwed
fathers a simple means to show their interest. Id. at 263 n.20. Furthermore, "[t]he measure
is intended to codify the minimum protections for the putative father which Stanley would
require." Id.
137. Id. at 264-65.
138. Id. at 262 n.19.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 267-68.
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the distinction between married and unmarried fathers was
clearly "rational.""'
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented because
they were unhappy with the easy dismissal of notice and an2
opportunity to be heard. They also viewed the facts quite differently. 1
In the dissent's narrative, Lehr was not a reluctant parent, but
rather, a thwarted father. He had lived with the mother for two
years, right up until the birth of their child.143 He visited her every
day at the hospital, but when she was discharged, she hid from
him. 1" He searched and occasionally located them, only to lose
track again.'" He finally hired a detective agency, only to find that
Lorraine was already married to Mr. Robertson.'" Lehr claimed
that Lorraine refused his offers of financial aid for the child and
forced him to stay away from her."7 It was after he was frustrated
that he retained counsel who wrote to the mother to inform her
that if she did not let Lehr visit his child, he would seek legal
action.'" At that point, perhaps in reaction, the Robinsons
commenced the stepfather adoption petition.'49
On an abstract level ofconstitutional jurisprudence, the dissenting
Justices afforded the "mere biological relationship" more weight
than the majority, although they did not really explain their
decision to do so. Justice White opined, "I reject the peculiar notion
that the only significance of the biological connection between
father and child is that 'it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
5 In his view, "[a] 'mere biological relationship' is not
offspring.""O
as unimportant in determining the nature of liberty interest as the
majority suggests."'' Where there was no doubt about the identity
or location of the putative father, the dissenting Justices found it
difficult to accept such cavalier treatment ofprocedural protections
and insistence on "the sheerest formalism to deny him a hearing
because he informed the State in the wrong manner."'52 The
dissenters objected to this "grudging and crabbed approach to due
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 268 n.27.
at 268-76 (White, J., dissenting).
at 268-69.
at 269.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 275.
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process."' They also recognized that the child was not really at
risk while these proceedings went on: she was with her mother, and
would stay with her mother even if a hearing were to be held on
Lehr's claims."5 Aside from illustrating how easy it is to paint a
different picture of a man's behavior, the dissent seems focused
primarily on the majority's dilution of procedural due process."' 5
Even though the Court affirmed the rights of unmarried fathers
who stepped forward, those men lost when they competed against
what the plurality in Michael H. v. GeraldD. 5 ' called the "unitary
family."' 7 Michael H. v. GeraldD. involved a substantive due process
challenge' to a California statute that denied a putative father the
right to establish a relationship with his child if the mother was
married to another man and both she and her husband insisted that
the child was born of their marriage.'5 9 Victoria was born while her
mother was living with her husband Gerald D. 6 However, her
mother was having an adulterous affair with Michael H., and
during the first three years of Victoria's life, she and her mother
resided intermittently with Michael and with Gerald.'' Eventually,
the mother returned to her husband with the child and
subsequently cut off all contact between Michael and Victoria."6
Her husband stood in solidarity with her, as a unified marital
family, claiming young Victoria as a product of the marriage."
California law provided that only a mother or her husband could
deny the paternity of a child born into a marriage." Absent the
mother's consent, Michael H. lacked standing to establish his
paternity or to seek any kind of visitation. In a sense, Michael H.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 275. Applying the "risk of error" test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976), the balance leaned toward providing additional procedural safeguards to the
putative father. He had a lot to lose, but granting him the hearing mistakenly was not
going to disturb the status quo in the child's life with her mother and stepfather.
155. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 276 (White, J., dissenting).
156. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding
California statute denying standing to nonmarital father of married woman's child).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 111. The Court did not consider an equal protection claim because it was not
raised or reached below. Id. at 116-17.
159. Id. Michael H. had taken blood tests which showed him to be the father of Victoria
with a high probability of accuracy, had lived with the child and her mother, and the little
girl called him "Daddy" (as she also did her mother's husband). Id. at 143-44.
160. Id. at 113-14.
161. Id. at 114.
162. Id. at 115.
163. Id. The mother withdrew her stipulation to the results of the blood tests which
showed a high degree of likelihood that Michael was Victoria's father. Id. at 114-15.
164. Id. at 117.
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could be considered a backwards stepfather 'adoption' case. Blood
tests later repudiated by the mother had shown Michael H. to be
the biological father to a high degree of certainty,'6 and the child
called him "Daddy." 6 6 Victoria also lived with her mother and her
mother's husband, who held her out as his own child.' By precluding
the putative father from establishing any legal relationship to the
child, the Court elevated the mother's husband from stepfather to
legal father without terminating any other man's rights or going
through an adoption proceeding.
Michael argued that he had developed a parental relationship
with his daughter during the first three years of her life by living
with her, visiting her, holding her out as his own, and caring for
her.168 This should have put him squarely on the protected side of
the line drawn in Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr. 9 In an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, however, the plurality disagreed
with the putative father and opined that this argument "distorts
the rationale of those cases."'70 The Justices' new gloss on the old
cases was that they "rest not upon ... isolated factors but upon the
historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term
- traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within
the unitary family."'' Stanley, for example, was reinterpreted to
have been about the destruction of such a family upon the death of
the unmarried mother.'7 2 Michael H., however, involved a unique
factor: that Victoria's mother was married to another man at the
time that the child was conceived, a fact that made this case quite
different from the preceding paternity cases under the plurality's
analysis. Tradition dictated a preeminence of protection for the
marital family.' 7' From this observation, Justice Scalia segued
into a debate about substantive due process methodology and about
how the Court should derive new fundamental rights in general.'74
It concluded that the only way that a family consisting of Michael
H. and his biological daughter could be recognized was if it did not
compete with a family consisting of the girl, her mother, and the
man who was married to her mother at the time of the child's
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 110.
See id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
Id. at 124. See also id. at 124 n.4.
Id. at 123-27.
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birth. 75 By contrast to a traditional family, the relationships in the
nontraditional unit lacked a fundamental liberty interest. The
plurality even suggested that without this level of substantive
recognition, Michael H.'s interests enjoyed no protection at all. 7 '
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, declined to join the strict
version of due process methodology 77 expressed in footnote six of
the plurality opinion. 78 The reduced plurality would have relied on
the most narrowly stated and specific historical traditions to
determine which interests are fundamental and thus, which family
was protected, but the concurring Justices found such an approach
inconsistent with past decisions of the Court.'7 9
The child's interest in having a relationship with Michael H.
also received short shrift. Although observing that the United
States Supreme Court has "never had [the] occasion to decide
whether a child has [a] liberty interest, symmetrical with that of
her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship," the plurality
found that the girl's due process claim was even weaker than her
putative father's claim, and must fail as well. 80 Children had no
traditional right to multiple fathers.'8

175. Id. at 129. See also, id. at 124.
176. The opinion does not acknowledge that nonfundamental liberty interests exist, or
that they enjoy some protection, albeit, at a much reduced level. See, Laura Oren, Section
1983 and Sex Abuse in Schools: Making a FederalCase Out of It, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 747,
759-61 (explaining that a liberty interest is necessary for due process protection, but
substantive review is only cursory unless the liberty involved is held to be fundamental).
177. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
178. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (joining all but
footnote 6). Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment only, also clearly did not
embrace the hoary tradition-only approach to deriving liberty interests. Although he thought
that the biological father received an opportunity to establish the best interest of the child
in this particular case, he opined that he would not foreclose the possibility that a
constitutionally protected relationship between a biological father and child might exist in
another such case. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
179. Id. at 132. (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justice
Kennedy's recent passionate invocation ofliberty in the case overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), and declaring that Texas could not criminalize private homosexual
sodomy between consenting adults, illustrates the significance of the reservation about due
process methodology. See, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Bowers had relied on an
argument based upon specific tradition to uphold Georgia's sodomy law. Id. at 566-67.
Lawrence, however, cast its due process liberty interest net more broadly. See id. at 575.
180. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
181. Id. at 130-31. Taken in isolation, the child's claim to a relationship with her biological
father failed for the same reasons his did. Id. at 131. Finally, Justice Scalia's opinion
dismissed her equal protection argument as not entitled to heightened scrutiny because she
was not claiming discrimination on the basis of her illegitimacy but rather, on the basis of
her legitimacy. Id. at 131-32. Preservation of the harmony of the marital family therefore
prevailed as a rational state interest. Id.
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. was mostly about the
methodology of constitutional decision-making."5 2 Justice Brennan
opined that the exclusive reliance on "tradition" at the most
specific level was both "novel" and "misguided."" He found this
interpretive approach particularly "troubling" because it was
"unnecessary.""" Indeed, the interest in the relationship between
Michael H. and his daughter so closely resembled prior
jurisprudence, that the dissent found it easy to link this case with
those through a unifying theme. In the words of Lehr, quoting
Caban,"When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child'.. . his interest in personal
contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the
Due Process Clause." 1" This is the line between mere biology and
a developed relationship drawn by previous cases. Justice Brennan
rejected the notion that concern for the "unitary family" somehow
transformed the meaning of this line of cases.,8 Finally, Justice
Brennan distinguished between Michael's ability to get a
meaningful hearing on his liberty interest, that is, his procedural
due process claim, and his ability to ultimately prevail on the
merits.8 7 He noted that Quilloin endorsed the use of the "best
interest [of the child] standard," rather than the "unfitness
standard," for a putative father who opposed adoption of his child
by another man.' Michael H., due to a conclusive statutory
presumption, never had the opportunity to argue the issue.18 9
Despite the dissenters' well-taken arguments, Michael H. was
not really about repudiating the line between a reluctant unwed
father and a man who steps forward to grasp the unique
opportunity of biology. Rather, through Michael H. the emerging
Court of the 1990s signaled the remaining Justices of the Warren
Court that there was going to be a new way of doing business."
182. Id. at 137-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J.).
183. Id. at 140.
184. Id. at 141.
185. Id. at 143 (alteration original) (citations omitted). In a separate dissent, Justice White
similarly had no difficulty in construing the line of personal relationship cases to establish
that a man who has a developed relationship with his nonmarital child also acquires a
liberty interest in maintaining that relationship. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 143-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 146.
188. Id. at 147 n.5.
189. Id. at 148-50.
190. See, e4g., Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Ox is Gored?, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 5 n.33
(1999/2000) (explaining that the Rehnquist Court has limited Warren Court decisions in
areas of due process, equal protection, and individual liberties) Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
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The plurality characterized the claim as substantive, thereby
requiring the kind ofsuper-liberty interest designated as "fundamental"
in order for the putative father even to get his foot in the door.
Having set the bar this high, it was easy to dispose of Michael's
effort to be heard. The Brennan dissenters disliked both what they
saw as a conflation of two questions (whether a liberty interest
exists at all and what procedures may validly terminate that interest)
and the new due process methodology of relying on tradition and
history to define liberty interests, and articulating recognized
interests as narrowly as possible. Viewed outside the context of the
plurality's promotion of the traditional "unitary" marital family,
Michael H. clearly was not a reluctant father. He also was not a
thwarted father who had been denied the opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child in the first place. However, this new
methodology allowed the plurality to strip his efforts at fatherhood
of any significance and deny him the right to pursue his paternity.
Although Michael H. first used the language, the entire line of
personal relationship cases from Stanley through Michael H.
touches on the "unitary family." These cases all concern an existing
family that generally conforms to the normative ideal of a private
family. Even though his family apparently received public assistance
and was formed without the stamp of legal approval, Peter Stanley
headed a de facto family comprised of himself and the three
children he had "sired and raised" over the preceding eighteen
years. 19' With the death of his children's mother, the state sought
to upset that family structure, but the majority of the Supreme
Court protected the Stanley family, finding it quite comparable to
other private family arrangements. There was also an existing de
facto family in each of the Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr stepfather
adoption cases. In each case, the child's home was not at issue: the
child would continue living with its biological mother." 2 The real
issue was whether one 'father' could be rejected in favor of another
'father,' leaving mother, child, and father as a normative private
family which could be called 'unitary.' Whatever the motives for the
switch, the end result would be a traditional family, albeit with
some of the actors moved around.

Removing the Blindfold from Lady Justice, 88 GEO. L.J. 115, 137 (1999) (concluding the
Warren Court began the Due Process Revolution, the Burger Court slowed it, and the
Rehnquist Court is moving in a very different direction).
191. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972).
192. But see, Caban, 441 U.S. at 383-84 (showing that the biological father and his wife
unsuccessfully cross-petitioned for adoption).
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This suggests the following observations about the children in
those families. First, that the children's living arrangements with
their biological mothers would be undisturbed regardless of the
results may imply that time was not of the essence as in the
newborn, thwarted father cases discussed below. Second, the
child's wishes do not occupy center stage insofar as they might lead
to a more complicated pattern of family life. For example, in
Michael H., little Victoria lived with two men at different times, her
biological father and her mother's husband. Each one claimed her
as his daughter, but there was no room for a solution that
recognized a de facto family with two fathers. One 'father' had to be
chosen over the other. Mr. Quilloin's child stated that he wished
both to continue intermittent contact with his biological father and to be adopted by his stepfather.19 His mother rejected that
proposition because she thought that occasional visits were disruptive
for the child.194 Here too, the constitutional model of the 'natural
family' allowed only one father at a time, a normative private
family. Accordingly, if the biological father fell down on the job, he
could be replaced entirely and easily by a stepfather, preserving a
'unitary family.' This approach to personal relationships is also
consonant with another family policy priority: ensuring that there
is one man financially responsible for each child, thereby relieving
the public fisc of that economic burden.
III: UNMARRIED FATHERS AND THE INTEREST IN
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC Fisc

In the constitutional jurisprudence ofnonmarital fathers' rights
to personal relationships with their children, all putative fathers
were not equal. Biology alone did not reign supreme. Rather, the
Court emphasized the distinction between willing and reluctant
putative fathers, albeit with a side trip for a paean to the "unitary
family." In another series of cases, the Court showed little
hesitation in imposing financial obligations on reluctant putative
fathers based on the biological connection simpliciter. State laws
that differentiated between a marital and a nonmarital child's
ability to seek child support from her father were struck down as
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.19 Although the prevailing distinctions based on the
193. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251 n.U.
194. Id. at 251.
195. See, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (finding a law that denied the right of
paternal support to nonmarital children unconstitutional); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
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parents' marital status could hardly be justified, the Court's
motives may be read as less than child-friendly. In view of
developments in public assistance, these decisions ultimately
protected the State's interest in safeguarding the public fisc as
much as, or perhaps even more than, the child's private interest in
receiving support from her father. When considering the cost of
blood tests to resist the establishment of paternity, the Court
recognized unmarried fathers' private interests in order to ensure
the accuracy of the biological tie." The Court was less concerned,
however, with biological accuracy when it came to the burden of
proof in paternity cases.' 97 The dominance of the state's financial
interest over any personal association concern was especially clear
in a public assistance household income case. 9 8 Regardless of the
impact on familial relationships, Congress could freely decide that
an unmarried father's child, whom he was supporting, needed to be
included in an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
income qualifying unit along with half-siblings whose fathers had
not stepped forward.' Finally, for an unmarried father seeking
citizenship benefits for his child, stepping forward provided no
advantage."e This too, may be seen as protection of the public fisc,
albeit in less overtly financial terms.
In the succinct 1973 opinion of Gomez v. Perez,2 ° ' the majority
of the Court brushed aside Texas' objections to granting nonmarital
children the same "judiciallyenforceable right to support from their
natural fathers" as that enjoyed by "legitimate" children.' The
(1982) (holding that a one year limit on a nonmarital child's right to bring a paternity suit
unconstitutional); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (invalidating a two year limit); Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (finding even a six year statute of limitations invalid). But see
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (concluding that a mother had no standing to
complain that a Texas statute allowed prosecution of only marital fathers for nonpayment
of child support).
196. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (determining that a Connecticut statute, which
allocated the cost of blood grouping tests in paternity actions to the party requesting them,
denied due process when applied to indigent defendant).
197. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (considering preponderance of the evidence
a sufficient standard for establishing paternity).
198. See Bowen v Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
199. Id.
200. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
201. Gomez 409 U.S. 535 (denying right of paternal support to nonmarital children
while granting it to marital children violates the Equal Protection Clause).
202. Id. at 535. At the time of the ruling, Congress had not yet authorized states to
require cooperation in identifying putative fathers and establishing paternity as a
condition of receiving public assistance. See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperationand Good
Cause: GreaterSanctions and the FailuretoAccount for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 367, 370 (discussing 1967 statute requiring states to set up paternity establishment
procedure, however, no cooperation sanction was imposed on recipients) (citing Meyers v.
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Court easily found that its recent private benefits cases, Levy v.
Louisiana' 8 and Weber v. Aetna,' led inexorably to the conclusion
that "a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally."2 5 Once Texas created a right to seek child support from
a "natural father," that right could not be denied merely because
that father had failed to marry the child's mother.2 's While
recognizing "lurking" proof of paternity problems, the Court
determined that those problems were insufficient to justify Texas'
absolute barrier to the child's claim.2 "7
After the Social Security Amendments of 1974, pursuant to
"cooperative federalism," states had to require that mothers receiving
AFDC cooperate in establishing the paternity of putative fathers. 2
Despite the Social Security Amendments of 1974 and Gomez, Texas
grudgingly opened only a small window of opportunity to sue
reluctant putative fathers to establish paternity and seek child
support. It enacted a law that provided only one year to bring such
a suit against the natural father of an "illegitimate" child. 20 9 This
statute was challenged in Mills v. Habluetzel,2 1 ° and the Court
struck it down as well.
Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759, 761 (D.Or. 171), affd, 404 U.S. 803 (1971)). Fontana observes,
however, that many individual states enacted cooperation requirements that were
subsequently voided by the courts. Id. (listing decisions).
203. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (finding a violation of equal protection in the creation of a cause
of action for wrongful death of a parent on behalf of marital children but not on behalf of
nonmarital children).
204. 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (determining that exclusion of nonmarital children from sharing
equally with marital children in recovery of workers' compensation benefits upon the death
of a parent violated equal protection).
205. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57 and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)).
But see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (establishing that a mother lacked
standing to challenge a similar distinction in a criminal nonsupport statute in Texas).
208. Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647,88 Stat. 2337 (1975); see S.
REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C..N. 8133, 8154-55 (cooperation
requirement for AFDC); cf 45 CFR § 232.12(b), 233.10(aX1)(B); 42 U.S.C. 608(aX2),
(requirement of cooperation for Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. 1396k (cooperation requirement for
Food Stamps). But see 7 U.S.C. 2011-2030 (waiver of cooperation requirement for good
cause); 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX7)(A)(iii) (good cause waiver of cooperation requirement in
domestic violence situations).
209. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 95 (1982). The legislature first provided only a
procedure for voluntary legitimization, but the Texas courts found that this did not meet
the strictures of'Gomez. Id. at 93. After the Texas appellate court decision in Mills, the Texas
legislature expanded the one-year statute of limitations to four years. Id. at 95 n. 1.
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court did not consider the case to be moot because
it effectively barred the claims of the child who filed suit under the one year provision. Id.
210. Id. at 91.
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In Mills, the chief justification offered by Texas for allowing
marital children to seek support at any time during their minority,
even though nonmarital children had only a "truncated" opportunity
to do so, was the interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims.2 '
Then-Justice Rehnquist noted in his opinion for the Court that the
mother of this child had applied for AFDC, which required her to
assign any rights to support held by the child and "to cooperate
with the State" in the paternity suit.212 Recognizing the State's
concerns regarding stale or fraudulent claims and proof problems, 13
the Court held that Texas did not provide a "bona fide opportunity
to obtain paternal support" with its one-year window to file
paternity suits, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.1 4 The Court noted that "traditional" blood tests
did not establish paternity, but rather non-paternity through
exclusion.2 15 A man who was not excluded might be, but also might
not be, the father of the child.2"6 When the Court rendered its
decision in 1982, then-Justice Rehnquist observed that the
evidentiary value of the newer Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA)
testing, which could be used to reach a probability of paternity
statistic, was "still a matter of academic dispute."2 7
211. Id. at 96. The Court dismissed out of hand the further justification of the "State's
'interest in the continuation of the institutions of family and marriage," by discouraging out-ofwedlock births. Id. at 101, n.8. Punishing the innocent children for their parents' wrongdoing,
the Court noted, had been rejected in Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164 (1972), Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978), Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), and Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976).
212. Mills, 456 U.S. at 96, n.2 (citing 42 USC § 602(a)(26)(A), (B)(i)).
213. Id. at 97-100.
214. Id. at 97. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the further due process claim in
light of its equal protection conclusion. Id.
215. Id. at 98 n.4.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Paul I. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 PaternityCases Not
Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1978) (pro-test); Leonard R. Jaffee, Comment
on the JudicialUse ofHLA Paternity Test Results and Other StatisticalEvidence:Response
to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1979)). For example, Texas' law of paternity has been totally
revamped more than once. The state has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, with
significant variation. Section 160.505 of the Texas Family Code provides:
A man is rebuttably identified as the father of a child under this chapter if the
genetic testing complies with this subchapter and the results disclose:
(1) that the man has at least a 99 percent probability of paternity, using a prior
probability ofO.5, as calculated by using the combined paternity index obtained
in the testing-, and
(2) a combined paternity index of at least 100 to 1.
(b) A man identified as the father of a child under Subsection (a) may rebut the
genetic testing results only by producing other genetic testing satisfying the
requirements of this subchapter that:
(1) excludes the man as a genetic father of the child; or
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Under Texas law, "the only paternity cases which actually go
to trial.., are those in which the putative father has refused to
submit to blood tests or has not been excluded by their results"2 1 ';
therefore, other forms of evidence remained important for those
cases.219 This conventional testimony could become stale or suborned,
so the state's interest was not insubstantial."0 Nonetheless, the
Court found an equal protection violation in these circumstances.
Using the standard of "substantially related to a legitimate state
interest"2 2 ' as derived from Lalli, z Trimble,2 23 and Mathews v.
Lucas, 4 then-Justice Rehrquist found that the one year statute of
limitations failed two preconditions of constitutionality. First, the
period for filing suit had to be long enough to provide a genuine
opportunity to claim paternity. 21 Second, the length of any such
time limitation had to be "substantially related to the State's
interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims."2 2 '
Texas' one year provision did not afford enough of an opportunity
for a mother to file suit on her own. Significantly, the majority also
noted that even if the state intervened and brought the law suit,
administrative delays could use up the statutory time period.227
Moreover, this "unrealistically short time limitation" did not bear
a substantial relationship to the legitimate problems of stale or

(2) identifies another man as the possible father of the child.
(c) Except as otherwise provided by Section 160.510, if more than one man is
identified by genetic testing as the possible father of the child, the court shall
order each man to submit to further genetic testing to identify the genetic father.
In other words, the prior exclusion approach has given way to a probability of paternity
evidentiary standard. The term "genetic testing" includes more than just the initial HLA
blood groupings standard. TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.503 (Vernon 2001). Genetic testing is the only
way to rebut the paternity of a child with a "presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated father."
TEX. FAM. CODE §160.631 (Vernon 2001).
218. Mills, 456 U.S. at 98 n.4.
219. The Court cited lack of access as a factor. Id.
220. Id. at 98-99.
221. Id. at 99.
222. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,269 (1978) (recognizing proof problems for an inheritance
issue).
223. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (recognizing proof problems for an
inheritance issue).
224. 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (regulating social security benefits). Justice Rehnquist found no
significant distinction based on the specific interest at stake. Mills, 456 U.S. at 99 n.5.
226. Mills, 456 U.S. at 99.
226. Id. at 99-100.
227. Id. at 100.
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fraudulent claims. 2" The Court found no reason for this haste,
which effectively precluded many claimants, nor any reason to
believe such claims became stale in only twelve months.2
In her concurrence in Mills, Justice O'Connor was concerned
that the majority opinion did not clearly state that a four year
statute of limitations would not fix the problems identified by the
Court. 3 0 She observed that the state had another interest that was
counter to the avoidance of stale or fraudulent claims: the "desire
to reduce the number of individuals forced to enter the welfare
rolls.""' If unwed mothers found it more difficult to seek child
support, then the burden on the state welfare system would
increase." 2 "Thus, while the State surely has an interest in
preventing the prosecution of stale and fraudulent claims, at the
same time, it has a strong interest, peculiar to the State itself, in
ensuring that genuine claims for child support are not denied.2 In
addition to emphasizing this countervailing interest, the concurrence
expressed greater comfort with the scientific developments in blood
testing."' Justice O'Connor also observed that marital children
typically had their causes of action tolled for their entire minority
in Texas, raising questions about the motives behind this disparate
treatment of marital and nonmarital children." Finally, she opined
that the practical difficulties of filing suit that are recognized
within the first year of birth persisted beyond that time.23 6
In Pickett v. Brown,"' decided in 1983, the Court invalidated
a Tennessee statute with a two year limitation period. Tennessee's
law incorporated an exception related to the state's interest in
defending its welfare rolls from claims. The state could bring suit
any time before a child's eighteenth birthday if a child was a public

228. Id. at 101.
229. Id. at 102.
230. Id. at 102. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 103.
232. Id. at 104.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 104 n.2 (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (discussing American Bar
Association and American Medical Association report indicating that a series of blood tests
could have a ninety percent probability of negating a finding of paternity for erroneously
accused men)). See Miale, et al., Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic
Testing in Problemsof DisputedParentage,10 FAM. L.Q. 247,258 (1976). See also Terasaki,
supra note 30, and Ira Mark Ellman & David Kaye, Probabilitiesand Proof-Can HLA and
Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?,54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979) (discussing blood test
developments).
235. Mills, 456 U.S. at 104-05.
236. Id. at 105-06.
237. 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983).
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charge, or was liable to become one.' Nearly all other parties,
however, faced a two year statute of limitations." 9 Justice Brennan
wrote for a unanimous Court that the two year period did not
provide a reasonable opportunity for those affected to bring their
claims. ' The strength of the state's asserted interest in preventing
stale or fraudulent claims, moreover, was undercut by the exception
for children receiving public assistance.2" If they could litigate older
claims in one instance, why not the other? While conceding the
state's interest in protecting the public fisc, Justice Brennan
understandably stressed the child's interest in obtaining support
and in "establishing a relationship to his father."2' 2
In the last of this series of cases, a unanimous Court firmly
closed the door on statutes of limitations for establishing
paternity. By 1988, when Clark v. Jeter 3 was decided, it was
merely a constitutional coda, made unnecessary by federal statutory
developments. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments (CSEA)
of 1984 already required all states wishing to retain their Title
IV-D funding to allow paternity suits during the entire minority of
nonmarital children. This question of federal preemption had not
been properly addressed in the case;' therefore, the Court addressed
constitutional doctrine again: it found that Pennsylvania's six year
statute of limitations on bringing paternity actions also violated
equal protection.' The rationale of stale and fraudulent claims
could not uphold the limitation, even for an arguably more
reasonable time period. Pennsylvania did not limit the period for
proof of paternity in intestacy cases or when the father himself
sought to establish his paternity.' It tolled all other civil causes of
action for the minority of the child, and it had only recently revised
its statute to comply with the eighteen year old federal
requirement.m The state apparently was not daunted by proof
problems in other contexts. Moreover, "increasingly sophisticated
tests for genetic markers" put to rest many doubts about stale and
238. Id. at 12.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 12-13.
241. Id. at 15. In addition, the availability of scientific blood tests alleviated any concern.
Id. at 17. On the growing acceptance of blood testing, see also Stroud et a]., Paternity
Testing- A CurrentApproach, 16 TRIAL 46 (1980).
242. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 14, n.13. See also id. at 16, n.15.
243. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
244. Id. at 459 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(aX5X1982 ed., Supp. IV)).
245. Id. at 469.
246. Id. at 463.
247. Id. at 464.
248. Id.
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fraudulent claims."' 9 The congressional drafters ofthe federal CSEA
reported in 1983 that such tests permitted the exclusion of over
ninety-nine percent of putative fathers, and could be used regardless
of the age of the child.' Thus, the Pennsylvania provision could not
survive "heightened scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause."'
An interesting thread runs through the cases invalidating
statutes of limitations for paternity and child support. In each
situation, the state limited the ability to file suit against unmarried
fathers, which paradoxically cuts against its own interest in
maximum collection. The Justices focused on the rights of
nonmarital children, but they clearly considered the impact of their
decisions on the public fisc. At the same time, the increasing
evidentiary credibility of blood tests may have contributed to a
greater willingness to establish the father-child relationship
through proof of biology alone. Apparently, the child's entire minority
could pass without any personal contact, but financial obligations
could not be escaped so long as there was factual proof of paternity.
The private interests of the unmarried father, however,
prevailed under limited circumstances in the public fisc cases. For
a reluctant father who wanted to avoid the imposition of the
financial obligations arising from the establishment of paternity,
blood tests could be critical as a defense. The unmarried father in
2 succeeded on a procedural due process claim
Little v. Streater"
because his indigency denied him access to the all-important blood
tests necessary to defend against a paternity suit filed against him
under Connecticut law.s In order to qualify her child for public
assistance, Gloria Streater identified Walter Little as the girl's
father.' The state then provided an attorney for the mother to
249. Id. at 465. In this case, the tests showed Gene Jeter to have 99.3% probability of
being the child's father. Id. at 456.
250. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-527, at 38 (1983)). The Court noted at the outset that
while illegitimacy classifications, in general, were subject to intermediate scrutiny
(substantially related to important governmental objective), the Court previously had
acknowledged that concern about proof problems might justify a somewhat different
treatment in the support context. hi at 461.
251. Id. at 463.
252. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
253. Id. at 17 n.13 (discussing the Court's failure to reach Little's equal protection claim).
254. Id. at 3. The Connecticut statute's disclosure and cooperation requirement derived
from 42 U.S.C. § 654 (4) reads:
as to any child born out of wedlock for whom benefits under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program are claimed, the states must undertake to
establish... paternity.., unless ... it is against the best interests of the child
to do so' and 'to secure support for such child from his parent.'
Id. at 9 n.6. See also 45 CFRC.F.R. § 232.12 (1980). A mother who failed to disclose the name
of the nonmarital father could be fined or imprisoned for contempt. Little, 452 U.S. at 9
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bring a paternity suit against the alleged father and to establish his
child support obligation. u 5 At the time of the litigation, the putative
father was in jail and unable to pay for the costs of blood testing."6
Unfortunately for him, Connecticut law put the burden on the
defendant to show his innocence once he was named as the
father.2 5 After the case went forward without the blood tests,
Little's paternity was adjudicated and a judgment rendered against
him for almost $7000, plus the costs of suit and attorneys' fees.2 8
The court ordered him to pay child support and the arrears at the
rate of $2.00 a month directly to the state, which was supporting
his child.2"9
The Court considered whether, under all the circumstances of
the case, the state's refusal to pay for the blood tests resulted in a
denial of a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" and therefore a
denial of procedural due process.2 ° Mathews v. Eldridge"1 used a
balancing test for determining what process is due: weigh the
private interest at stake; the risk of error of present procedures and
the likelihood of reducing that through introducing additional
safeguards;2 2and the government's interest, including administrative
efficiency.
As applied in Mr. Little's case, these three factors led the Court
to conclude that he did not receive a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.2" 3 In that assessment, the Court emphasized the "unique
quality of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence,
the State's prominent role in the litigation, and the character of
paternity actions under Connecticut law." 2' The private interest at
stake was none other than the "creation of the parent-child
relationship," a relationship that was so important to both parent
and child that the Court was willing to say, at this juncture and in
(citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-169 (1981)). The State's Attorney General automatically
became a party to the paternity action and any settlement agreement needed state approval.
Little, id. (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-160, 46b-170 (1981)).
255. Little, 452 U.S. at 9.
256. Id. at 3-4. He was represented by Legal Aid. Id.
257. Id. at 11-12.
258. Id. at 3-4.
259. Id. at 4.
260. Id. at 6.
261. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
262. Little, 452 U.S. at 6 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
263. Id. at 16-17.
264. Id. at 6 (citing Miale, et al., supra note 234; see Mark Edward Larson, Jr., Blood
Test Exclusion Proceduresin PaternityLitigation:The UniformActs and Beyond, 13 J. Faro.
L. 713 (1973-1974); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 156, 76 A.2d 717, 719 (1950) (an
opinion by then-Judge Brennan)).

2004]

PARADOX OF UNMARRIED FATHERS AND THE CONSTITUTION

79

this context, that it created a "compelling" private interest in the
"accuracy" of its determination.2 The State shared the interest in
accuracy, but most importantly it had "legitimate" financial
interests where children born out of wedlock relied on public
assistance.' Given the high risk of error in Connecticut's statutory
scheme, however, this governmental interest was not sufficient to
justify refusing to advance the costs of a blood test to an indigent
defendant." 7 Indeed, much of the opinion was taken up with an
evaluation of the significance of human blood grouping evidence to
exclude alleged fathers.2 The rest of the emphasis was on the
integral role the state played in this paternity proceeding.26 9
Despite the nominal parties, it was the state who was the moving
force of this paternity action. The state compelled the mother, "upon
penalty of fine and imprisonment for contempt," to identify the
father as a pre-condition of receiving public assistance. The state's
Attorney General automatically became a party to the suit, and
that official's approval was required before settlement would be
approved. The state located and assigned the lawyer and paid the
attorney's fees. And finally, the state would collect any support
payments that the litigation compelled.2 70 This was no ordinary
dispute between private parties, but rather, a matter of public
family law. In addition, the statute created an unusual burden on
the defendant in a paternity action. So long as the mother of the
nonmarital child remained steadfast in her accusation, the burden
was placed on the defendant man to prove he was not the father of
the child7 1
The Court also sensed quasi-criminal overtones in the nature
of the proceeding in Connecticut, because a man found guilty of
paternity could be punished by imprisonment for refusing to pay
the ordered child support. 272 Blood tests, therefore, became even
more important to a man placed in this position. Without them, the
risk of error was high, but with them, there would be a "valuable

265. Little, 451 at 13. In Little, the Court likened the importance of creating the parentchild relationship to terminatingthat relationship, but in Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574
(1987), which approved a preponderance of the evidence standard for establishing paternity,
that equivalency disappeared.
266. Little, 452 U.S. at 14.
267. Id. at 15-16.
268. Id. at 6-8.
269. Id. at 9-12.
270. Id. at 9 ('State action' has undeniably pervaded this case.").
271. Id. at 10-11.
272. Id. at 10.
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procedural safeguard." 7 3 Thus, while eschewing any sweeping
statement about costs in a privately initiated paternity suit, this
case, with its strong public law overtones, required the state to
advance an indigent man the costs of the blood tests that might
exculpate him from the paternity charge.27
The Little Court concluded that the private interests were
strong, the public interests relatively weaker, and the risk of error
was high with current procedures.2 7 Therefore, as applied to Mr.
Little, Connecticut's refusal to pay for blood tests violated his
procedural due process rights under the Constitution.276 The dispute
about blood tests costs clearly arose in the context of state efforts to
protect the public fisc by imposing financial obligations on men
shown to be biological fathers. The Court did not find the state
concerns with the public fisc to be misplaced, but rather it objected to
a procedure which stacked the deck against the unmarried father
to an unreasonable degree. The Justices opined that the "creation
of the parent-child relationship" required the same procedural
fairness as did "termination of such bonds."27 7 They even found
"both the child and the defendant in a paternity action have a
compelling interest in the accuracy of such a determination.2 1
The Court's nod to the strength of the relationship interest did
not stop it from concluding subsequently that, unlike in termination
273. Id. at 14.
274. Apparently, the State could demand reimbursement for the blood test costs if the
defendant was established as the father. Id. at 15.
275. Id. at 13-16.
276. Id. at 16-17.
277. Id. at 13. The cases establishing the significance of termination of parental rights
and the consequent special procedural safeguards necessary started with the Court's five to
four decision in Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18
(1981). In Lassiter,the Court held that the Constitution does not require appointed counsel to
represent indigent parents in every termination proceeding where the child was a public
charge. Id. at 24-32. The mother, who was in jail, displayed little interest in the child's
welfare. Id. at 21. She received notice of the hearing, but failed to inform her courtappointed criminal lawyer about it. Id. The child was living with foster parents who
wanted to adopt him, but his status was in limbo until the termination suit was decided.
Id. at 19-24. Another split decision followed, with different results, when the Court ruled
in Santosky v. Kramer that termination of parental rights requires proof of grounds by
clear and convincing evidence, regardless of whether the suit was initiated privately or
publicly. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In 1996, in MLB v. S.L.J., the Court required the state to pay
the cost of a trial transcript which was necessary to make a meaningful appeal in a
termination lawsuit prosecuted by a father against his ex-wife, where the appellant was
indigent. 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Court was once again divided. See id. at 129. The
termination cases, however, presuppose that the defendant legally satisfies the definition
of 'parent,' which unmarried fathers may not. Thus, statutory definitions of 'parent' and
the constitutional personal relationship cases control the relevance of the termination
decisions to unmarried fathers.
278. Little, 452 U.S. at 13.
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cases, a simple preponderance of the evidence was enough to
establish paternity. The majority in Rivera v. Minnich. 9 made it
clear that this was actually about money, and not about precious
personal associations. The Rivera decision meant that it was easier
to establish paternity than to terminate parental rights. In his
opinion, Justice Stevens observed that the termination cases were
distinguishable because there was no equivalence between "the
State's imposition of the legal obligations accompanying a biological
relationship between parent and child and the State's termination
of a fully existing parent-child relationship," at least for purposes
of the required burden of proof.2 8' The Court opined that in the
'typical' contested paternity proceeding, the man who did not admit
paternity was in fact a reluctant father. 2 He was ipso facto not
interested in "providing the training, nurture, and loving protection
that are at the heart of the parental relationship, protected by the
2 4
His real interest was in not paying child support.
Constitution.'
By contrast, something "more precious than any property right"was
at risk when the state sought to permanently put an end to the
parent-child relationship.' Because of this difference in interests,
standard of proof in
there was no necessity to require the same
2
paternity as in termination proceedings. W
Somewhat disingenuously, the Rivera Court contrasted the
public nature of termination law - the state against the individual to the private law dispute of mother against father in a paternity
proceeding. 2' As we have seen, however, many of these private
disputes were in fact suits instigated by the state out of a welfare
collection rationale. On pain of penalty of both federal and state
law, mothers who needed public assistance for their children had
to identify putative fathers and either bring lawsuits against those
men or cooperate in the state's filing such suits." The Court,
279. 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
280. Id. at 579.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 580 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
284. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 580.
285. Id. (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-759).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 580-81.
288. For the introduction of the cooperation requirement into the AFDC program, see
Social Security Amendments (SSA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975); see
also Senate Report on SSA of 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.COAN. 8133, 8154-55 (the requirement could be waived for "good cause"); see also 42
USC § 602 (7)(AXiii).
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however, eschewed consideration of any state interest in avoiding
financial responsibility for nonmarital children, claiming instead to
judicially resolve such disputes without reference to the state's
interest in limiting welfare expenditures. 9
Justice Brennan's dissent neither minimized the financial
burden imposed by a finding of paternity, nor ignored its "legal and
moral dimensions. "2ee A man found to be the father of a nonmarital
child could face eighteen years of open-ended liability for support,
enforceable through all kinds of potent measures. 9 ' Beyond that,
he assumed the status of being a parent, with all the moral
implications attendant thereto.2" Blood tests, on the other hand,
were accurate enough to ensure that the higher standard of clear
and convincing evidence could be met."' Practical difficulties with
the heightened standard would only arise in those few cases where
29 4
blood test evidence was unavailable or unavailing for some reason.
Justice Brennan, however, dissented alone, the rest of the Rivera
Court having reduced the putative father's relationship with his
child to a question of financial obligation."5
Indeed, the Court was willing to approve the dominance of the
money concern even where it threatened to interfere with the
personal relationship that the Justices said was so important.
Bowen v. Gilliard9 challenged a provision in the 1984 Deficit
Reduction Act (DFRA) requiring states to "take into account, with
certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, and
sisters living in the same home" when calculating a family's eligibility
for benefits.2" This meant that in applying for AFDC benefits, a
custodial mother could no longer exclude from the filing unit a child
whose father supported him or her. 8 Instead, all income on behalf
of all children must be included, and she must seek public
assistance for all the children in the household.' For one of the
289. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 581, n.8.
290. Id. at 583 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 584 (stating that possible penalties include attachment of income, penalty for
arrears, confiscation of income tax refunds and incarceration for contempt).
292. Id. at 584-85.
293. Id. at 586.
294. Id.
295. See id.
296. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
297. Id. at 589 (citing The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494; 98 Stat 1145;
amended Section 402(a)(38) of the SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX38)(1982 ed., Supp. III)); cf Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (declaring food stamp household rules not unconstitutional).
298. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 590.
299. For sibling income deeming' rules and their effect on poor families, see, for example,
Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to
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named plaintiffs in the class, this meant not only a financial loss,
but a loss of a child's relationship to his father."°° The nonmarital
father of Sherrod visited him and was proud to say that he
supported his child without public assistance.3 "' Financially, the
deemed income rule meant that Sherrod had to be included in the
household unit. 3' His father's contributions of $200 a month were
counted against the family's income," and the family's grant was
reduced correspondingly.' Even with him as part of the filing unit,
Sherrod received no benefit, and his family suffered a loss of
income. 0 5 Worse still, his mother testified that Sherrod's father
began to withhold his usual support payments and ceased to visit
his son. 3 ' As Sherrod's mother stated,
[his father] is extremely opposed to his son being on welfare
benefits, and has told me that he stopped seeing his son because
I now receive AFDC for Sherrod .... [The boy] is very upset that

his father no longer visits him. He frequently asks me why his
daddy does not come to see him anymore. Since the time his
father has stopped visitation, Sherrod has begun to wet his bed
on a frequent basis. Also since the visitation stopped, Sherrod
has become much more disruptive, especiallyin school.
3 7Furthermore,
his performance in school seems to have declined. 0
While the dissent cited Sherrod's family as an example of a
deep intrusion into a constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship,3" the majority decided this was a question of the
rationality of welfare collection devices. 3" As a result of this
characterization, the Court's review was deferential. 1 ° The Court
reasoned that since the amendment "unquestionably serves
Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures,"311 the rationality
test was met by "saving huge sums of money."312 The amendment
was rationally related to a second purpose of spreading welfare
Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713 (1987-88).
300. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 621-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 591.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 1&
306. Id. at 621-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309. I& at 596-97.
310. Id. at 598.
311. Id. at 599.
312. Id6
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dollars around fairly between needy families in situations where
budget cuts were necessary. 1 3 The majority rejected the argument
that something more than rational basis review was implicated
because of the burden on "a family's fundamental right to live in the
type of family unit it chooses."3 14 This was not like Moore v. East
Cleveland,3 1 in which the state directly regulated the family, but
instead the income calculation rules were merely a part of a social
welfare program. 31 6 The equal protection and due process challenges
failed under the deferential standard of review. 31 7 Furthermore, the
Court rejected the complaint about the assignment provision of the
amendment. 318 The Court noted that when the state pays the AFDC
benefit, it bears the risk of noncollection of the child support
obligation." 9 The majority proudly recounted that between 1975,
when the assignment provision was added, and 1985 "legal
paternity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more
than 3.5 million support orders were established, and $6.8 billion
in support obligations was collected on behalf of children in AFDC
families.""2 ° By instituting a social welfare program, Congress did
not work a "taking."2 1 The Court eschewed any role in determining
the wisdom of the congressional rules.3 2 Rather, it was up to
Congress to fulfill "the difficult responsibility of allocating limited
public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients. 32 3
In Bowen, the distinction between the reluctant nonmarital
father and the one who steps forward is insignificant. Even if there
is some interference with what otherwise might be considered a
constitutionally protected relationship, the intrusion is not serious
or direct enough to trigger heightened scrutiny. Rather, when
enforcing obligations and collecting money, Congress and the states
enjoy broad discretion, within the bounds of rationality. Of course,
313. Id.
314. Id. at 588.
315. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating zoning rules that prevented grandmother from
living with her grandsons by two different sons).
316. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602.
317. Id. at 603.
318. Id. at 603 n. 19; see also id. at 591-92 (requiring recipients to assign their right to
receive child support payments for any member of the family included in the filing unit as
a condition for eligibility); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX26)(B) (1982 ed. Supp. III).
319. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 603 n. 19.
320. Id. (citing I Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Services, A Decade of Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to
Congress for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, pp. iii, 6, 9-10 (1985)).
321. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 605-06.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 607 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,487 (1969)).
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Bowen was neither brought by nonmarital fathers nor framed by
their concerns. Children and mothers whose public assistance
payments were reduced challenged the household income sharing
rules. Nor is it unusual for the Court to distinguish levels of
scrutiny for the myriad of regulations that affect the family. Some
trigger a fundamental rights analysis,3 2 while most do not."s The
drive to establish paternity and assign the proceeds of subsequent
child support orders over to the state clearly provides a context to
other jurisprudential developments in the 1970s and 1980s.
Nguyen v. INS,32 decided in 2001, demonstrates just how far
the Court has come in public fisc cases from Stanley's relationship
values. Nguyen is not, strictly speaking, a financial obligation
dispute. Indeed, Nguyen's father, Joseph Boulais, supported him to
his majority and continued supporting him even after the son got
into serious criminal trouble.327 But it is appropriate to view this
citizenship case against a public fisc backdrop, because it is about
to whom and how often the United States will give away the
valuable resource of citizenship. Federal law provides that children
born abroad to unmarried parents, one of whom is a United States
citizen and the other of whom is an alien, derive their citizenship
depending upon which parent was the United States citizen."
Unmarried mothers may pass their citizenship merely upon proof
of the biological relationship plus a year of continuous physical
residence in the United States sometime prior to the child's birth,
but without more, unmarried fathers may not.329
324. Forexample, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (establishing that Virginia's
anti-miscegenation laws also fail due process by interfering with a right long deemed
fundamental); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (stating that zoning rules
that prevented a grandmother from living with her grandsons by two different sons intruded
too deeply into the family unit and should not be afforded judicial deference); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978) (declaring a state law which denied the right to marry
to a man who could not prove that he could support children from a previous relationship,
impermissibly interfered with the fundamental right to marry).
325. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) ("By reaffirming the fundamental
character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which
relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."). See also
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (deciding that a provision of the Social Security Act
which terminated benefits for a permanently disabled child who married a spouse not
receiving disability benefits, was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose).
326. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
327. Al. at 57.
328. Id. at 59-60. An earlier case which involved the same provision at issue in Nguyen,
failed to resolve the issue at bar in Nguyen. Id. at 58. See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420 (1998) (discussing citizenship of a child with a military father).
329. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1988) (providing, in pertinent part, that where a nonmarital child
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In 1969, Joseph Boulais was a civilian employee in Vietnam
380
where he fathered a son out of wedlock with a Vietnamese woman.
After the end of the parents' relationship, the child lived with "the
family of [his father's] new Vietnamese girlfriend."" At the age of
six, Boulais brought his son to Texas where he raised him. 2 The
son held permanent legal resident status, which was not enough to
protect him from deportation when, at the age of 22, he was found
guilty of serious crimes involving sexual assault on a child.33 3 While
deportation was pending, Boulais established his paternity in a
state court through DNA testing. 33 Father and son thereafter
appealed the deportation order, arguing that the gender-based
distinction in the immigration statute violated equal protection. 35
Although the unmarried American biological father stepped
forward and raised his child from infancy while the alien mother
faded from the picture, that was not enough to satisfy the derivative
citizenship statute in light of his failure to legitimate his offspring
before his son reached the age of eighteen. 33 ' A majority of the
Court ruled this sex-based distinction valid, based on an ad hoc
explanation. Congress, the Court opined, was entitled to rely on a
presumed 'opportunity' that a citizen mother automatically enjoyed to
form a relationship with her nonmarital child, while refusing to
credit a developed relationship between a citizen father and his
child born out of wedlock.3 3 '
is born abroad to a citizen mother and noncitizen father, the child:
shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if
the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person's
birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United
States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year.).
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1988) (stating that a child born out of wedlock abroad to an
American citizen father and noncitizen mother can acquire citizenship only if
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by
clear and convincing evidence, (2) the father had the nationality of the United
States at the time of the person's birth, (3) the father (unless deceased) has
agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the person
reaches the age of 18 years, and (4) while the person is under the age of 18
years - (A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence
or domicile, (B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing
under oath, or (C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of
a competent court.).
330. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 58.
336. See statutes cited supra note 329.
337. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-65.
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The opportunity rationale was the second of two "important
governmental interests " "8 that the Nguyen Court said were
implicated. The first was the proof problem. This had been raised
with varying effect in earlier cases regarding benefits derived
through the unmarried father's relationship to his child. 9 In Weber
v. Aetna Casualty,' ° Louisiana excluded nonmarital children from
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits upon the death of their
father even where the children were actually dependent upon him for
support during his lifetime."' While conceding that in some
situations there may be "potentially difficult problems of proof,""' 2
Justice Powell opined that by "limiting recovery to dependents of
the deceased, Louisiana substantially lessen[ed] the possible
problems of locating illegitimate children and of determining
uncertain claims of parenthood."34 Given that the requirement for
dependency in the statute itself obviated the worst of the proof
problems, the distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'

338. Id. at 54. A gender-based equal protection challenge cannot pass muster without an
important governmental interest and the classification must be substantially related to that
interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for
gender-based classifications); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996) (applying heightened
scrutiny to a gender-based policy of admission exclusion in a public university).
339. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 533 (1971), (upholding Louisiana law barring a
nonmarital child from intestate succession to share in the estate of a man who died after
publicly acknowledging her but who never included her in a will). The Labine Court
distinguished Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American Guarantee, 391
U.S. 73 (1968) by claiming neither of those cases established the proposition that states could
not ever treat marital and non-marital children differently. Id. In Labine, only Justice
Brennan, dissenting, rejected the rationality of the state's alleged proof problem in a case
where there was no dispute over parentage and the father had actually acknowledged his
child. Id. at 552. In any case, it is not clear in Nguyen if the INS actually relied upon the
alleged proof problems. See 533 U.S. at 53, 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Rather, the
dissenters noted that the INS' argument focused on "ensuring that children who are born
abroad out of wedlock have, during their minority, attained a sufficiently recognized or
formal relationship to their United States citizen parent- and thus to the United States to justify the conferral of citizenship upon them; and second, preventing such children from
being stateless." Id.
340. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
341. Id. at 167-68.
342. Id. at 174.
343. Id.
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children was not justified.' It did not outweigh the injustice of
placing the 'sins' of their parents on innocent children."5
Justice Powell found the proof problems more persuasive in
another case, Lalli v. Lalli.346 His opinion for the Court upheld New
York's intestate succession act because he believed that its
requirement for adjudication of paternity before the death of the
putative father was fine-tuned enough to deal with spurious
claims." 7 While "[ejstablishing maternity is seldom difficult,"'
there were "peculiar problems of proof" when it came to the fathers of
out of wedlock children. 9 The father might not be a functioning
part of the family unit, or even know about the birth of his
biological child.' 0 Thus, because the state's interests in settling
estates and the "orderly disposition of a decedent's property at
death" were substantial3 51 and the reach of the statute was not
unnecessarily broad," 2 the Court upheld, in a sharply divided
opinion, the distinction between classes of 'illegitimate' children."sc
The statute in Nguyen required proof of the biological
connection between child and citizen parent.' For citizen mothers,
proof consisted of little more than giving birth.3 55 Nonmarital
children of citizen fathers had to show the blood relationship by
clear and convincing evidence, but they also had to do more."
These add-ons included a choice of legitimization, acknowledgment of
paternity, or adjudication by a competent court, which had to occur
before the child's eighteenth birthday. 7 Unfortunately for Nguyen,
his citizen father did not obtain the order of parentage from a state
344. Id. at 171-72.
345. Id. at 174-75. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), Justice Powell insisted that
although he was aware of the need to be sensitive to "lurking problems... [of] proof of
paternity," these difficulties should not be "made into an impenetrable barrier that works
to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Id. at 771 (citing Gomez. v. Perez, 409 U.S.535,
538 (1973)). In Trimble, the Court ruled that the Illinois Probate Act which allowed intestate
succession for nonmarital children only through their mothers, was unconstitutional. Id.
346. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
347. Id. at 269.
348. Id. at 268.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 271-73.
353. See, id. at 276 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 278-79
(Brennan, J., dissenting, on the grounds that this was an unjustified departure from the
principles of Trimble which would be most likely to exclude the most involved fathers who
took care of their children without the necessity of a paternity suit against them.)
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1988).
357. Id.
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court (based on DNA testing), until the son was already twentyeight years old."M Mr. Boulais had, in fact, complied with every
condition in the statute, other than the timing of the adjudication
of his biological connection to his son. 59
In the absence of special considerations such as the need for
orderly disposition of an estate, the passage of time is unimportant.6 0
As the dissent observed, DNA testing is as accurate after the age of
eighteen as it is prior to that time.3 6 ' The Court's analysis in
Nguyen displays the same crude, overbroad approach to problems
of proof of paternity that it condemned in Weber. Just as Louisiana
exaggerated the problems of proof under its own statutory scheme, so
did Congress.
The second purported governmental purpose in Nguyen, the
'opportunity' rationale, is more important for the purposes of this
article's exploration of the intersection of the personal relationship
and public fisc cases. The Nguyen Court explicitly eschews any
extra deference based on the subject matter of immigration,6 2 and
instead addresses the "basic biological differences" between women
and men." In theory, therefore, Nguyen is an application of the
heightened scrutiny that gender-based distinctions merit.36 4 The
"important governmental interest" presented by the government in
its briefs and emphasized above all other interests was
the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not
just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the
law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide
a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States.2
According to the majority, the 'opportunity' to develop such a
meaningful relationship between a citizen mother and her child
born overseas is automatic, given the fact of birth itself; that is,
there is an "initial point of contact" which provides that chance
6
('opportuniy) to develop the requisite "real, meaningful relationship."
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
See, e.g., id. at 60.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
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The biological fact of birth, however, does not create this same
opportunity for a citizen36 7father, who may not be present at the birth
or even know about it.

For the narrow majority in Nguyen, Justice Kennedy also
opined that Congress did not have to ignore the 'reality' of the
millions of American men in the armed services who travel to
foreign countries and who may not even know about children that
they leave behind."' That reality seemed to include a JohnnyAppleseed-like vision of American servicemen spreading their
progeny throughout the world. Justice Kennedy observed that in
1969 when Nguyen was conceived, there were almost 3.5 million
active duty military personnel, mostly men, and more than one
million of them were stationed in foreign countries.' Even in 1999,
there were more than 250,000 military personnel overseas.3 70 He
also noted that civilian travel also creates the potential for
71
unknown American-sired children throughout the world.1
Congress did not have to ignore the 'reality' that the father might
sow his seed but never even know about the birth of his child or
meet his offspring.
With no biologically determined "initial point of contact" with
the child, there is no necessary opportunity for a man to develop a
relationship with his offspring. While the "mother and child
reunion" is apparently "only a motion away," 7 ' the nonmarital
father's contact with his child is assumed to be unlikely. Even if
genetic testing proves the fact of paternity, according to the
majority in Nguyen, Congress may demand more, defined as an
'opportunity' to develop a relationship that automatically 'arises'
out of the mother-child bond of birth. 73 The Court's reasoning
rejected any notion that this was merely a stereotype of the
difference between men and women, insisting rather that it
reflected the 'enduring' differences between men and women that
37 4
Justice Ginsburg celebrated in the VMI military academy case.
The second part of the equal protection inquiry is whether the
means chosen substantially promote the asserted important
governmental interest. The Nguyen majority skates over what the
dissent identifies as another real problem in its analysis: an
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Paul Simon, Mother and Child Reunion, on PAuL SIMON (Warner Bros. 1972).
533 U.S. at 68.
Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
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unsatisfactory fit between the means and the end.3 75 The Court
finds the fit between a "policy which seeks to foster the opportunity
for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop" and "the governmental
interest in the actual formation of that bond" to be "almost
axiomatic.""76 The "basic biological differences" between men and
women, "such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth
but the father need not be," convinced the majority that the
congressional scheme did not violate equal protection.177 The
dissent, however, questioned why the 'opportunity' was more
important than the developed reality. 7" Where was the sex neutral
alternative that is appropriate under heightened scrutiny? Why did
Congress fail to focus on the opportunity for a relationship that
each parent might have, depending on the circumstances? These
omissions suggested to Justice O'Connor that Congress had relied
on just the sort of stereotypical thinking that the gender equal
protection cases condemn: that mothers always care about their
children, while unmarried fathers typically do not. 79
Mr. Boulais, much like Peter Stanley, had "sired and raised"
his son.' As such, the State could not have removed the boy when
he was under the age of eighteen from his father's custody without
the same fitness hearing that would be afforded an unmarried
mother or married parents. Like Mr. Caban, Boulais had stepped
forward in the years of his son's minority and developed a
relationship with him, and the state could not have dispensed with
his consent if another man had tried to adopt his young child.' Mr.
Boulais' biological parentage created "an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."8 2
Nonetheless, the Nguyen Court did not examine whether Mr.
Boulais seized that opportunity (because he clearly had). Rather,
the majority emphasized the 'opportunity' of a child's mother,
present at birth, to develop such a relationship. 3 It held that
Congress could focus solely on that potentiality and ignore the
384
reality of a biological father's developed relationship with his son.
Amazingly, the Court did so without invoking any special deference,
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 84-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 89.
See discussion of Stanley v Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972), supra pp. 49-53.
See discussion of Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,392-93 (1979), supra pp. 56-60.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-68.
Id. at 66-70.
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due to the federal government's control over immigration, and
without admitting to any dilution of the Court's previous equal
protection jurisprudence, concerning either gender or illegitimacy. 3"
In one sense, the Nguyen 'opportunity' argument rejects mere
biology as a rationale, but in another, deeper sense, it embraces it.
Just as the citizen mother's rights are determined by mere biology,
so too are the citizen father's. For her, all she needs is birth and,
ipso facto, the 'opportunity' for a relationship; for him, birth alone
prevents him from proving that he had a real relationship with his
nonmarital child. Despite the "exceedingly persuasive" burden that
the government should have met in order to justify this genderbased distinction, the Court accepted this post-hoc explanation
rather easily. 8 Thus, the opinion is consistent with the unmarried
father public fisc cases and their general tendency to afford biology the
dominant role when the question concerns preserving public goods.
IV: 'BIOLOGY PLUS' OR BIOLOGY ALONE?: THE APPARENT
PARADOXES OF NONMARITAL PATERNITY

A New York family court case encapsulates the apparent
paradox of 'biology plus' versus biology simpliciter in the
jurisprudence of unmarried fathers."' 7 "In a classic situation of the
right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing," two units of
the Orange County Social Services Department in New York State
initiated contradictory proceedings. 8 ' Robert S. had a nonmarital
relationship with Dawn H., which led to the birth of a child on
February 26, 2000.89 Allegedly, when he was told of Dawn's
pregnancy, Robert urged her to "have an abortion, to give the child
up for adoption or to sell the child.""' As a result, Dawn ended her
relationship with Robert in her third month of pregnancy."9 ' When
she gave birth, Dawn told the social worker at the hospital that she
was prepared to relinquish her parental rights and have the child
adopted. " The baby was placed in foster care, the mother signed
relinquishment papers, and the social worker then sent Robert a
385. Id. at 71-73.
386. When heightened scrutiny is applied, the state's rationale must be genuine, not
offered as an after-the-fact invented justification in the face of litigation. United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
387. Robert S. v. Orange County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 725 N.Y.S. 2d 183 (Fain. Ct. 2001).
388. Id. at 185.
389. Id. at 184.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id
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notice dated March 15, 2000, which he received but ignored.3 9
When the surrender instrument was approved, Dawn's parental
rights were ceded to the Department of Social Services, which took
custody and guardianship and placed the child in a pre-adoptive
home.3 9 ' Less than two months later, however, the Support
Collection Unit of the same department filed a petition to have
Robert adjudicated to be the child's father. 9 Robert denied
paternity, but after blood tests showed a high probability that he
was indeed the father, he withdrew his denial and admitted
paternity." When the Department realized the mix-up, it withdrew
its paternity petition, but then Robert requested a permanent order
of support. 97
The court adjudicated Robert to be the father on October 19,
2000, and along with his sister, he filed for custody of the child. 98
In this proceeding, the family court held that Robert had forfeited
his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his
biological child3s and that Robert had not responded to the biological
mother's announcement of her pregnancy or to the notice he received
from the Department of Social Services about the proceeding to
approve the surrender instrument.*°° When a different unit of the
agency accidentally summoned Robert to court, he first denied
paternity and then admitted it.'" By this time, the child was over
six months old."°2 The court further found it "telling" that it was
Robert's sister who sent the child letters and gifts, and that she
apparently was childless and had some interest in adopting the
child herself. The court also emphasized other 'facts' showing that
Robert had no personal contact with his biological child, nor had he
4
displayed any great interest in the infant in the first six months. 0
The net result of the court's analysis was that it upheld the
surrender, ruled that "care, custody and guardianship" remained
with the Department of Social Services, and dismissed Robert's
petition.' 4 While the court would have adjudicated Robert a father
on pure biology if the Department of Social Services had persisted
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
Id
Id,
Id.
Id. at 188.
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with its support effort, biology alone was not enough to ripen
Robert's inchoate interest into a recognized interest in a personal
relationship with his biological child. 0 5
Like the conflicting actions by social services in Robert's case,
the apparently paradoxical judicial doctrines on unmarried fathers
represent two sides of the same coin: the state's enforcement of the
prevailing model of the private family. Family law has been aptly
described as the most private of public law and the most public of
private law.' Both the relationship, 'biology plus' line of cases and
the public fisc, biology alone line of cases rest on a vision of the
perfect, private family in which an identifiable man (or substitute
for him) takes financial responsibility for his children. Individual
rights and public policy are modeled on that same view. This makes
some sense, but it also incorporates a punitive and coercive approach
to the legal treatment of unmarried women and their children, and
it entirely fails to consider other possibilities that might recognize
a broader societal responsibility for the welfare of children.
Currently, policymakers in Washington are pursuing paternity
establishment requirements with increased vigor, using a biological
determinist model of private responsibility. 7 At the same time,
state courts and legislatures are feeling their way through the
implications of the 'biology plus' requirement for relationship issues in
the nonmarital family."° States must engage in Lehr line-drawing
and resolve the problem of the 'thwarted father' who does not fit
easily into the Lehr paradigm.
A. The Public Fisc and PaternityEstablishment:Biology Reigns
Ever since 1975, with increasing vehemence, federal policy has
encouraged and, indeed, coerced the identification of the biological
fathers of nonmarital children."'9 This trend began with the
amendments to the Social Security Act of 1974 and related
legislation. 10 These legislative changes followed a period of
extraordinary growth in the welfare rolls in the 1960s, an increase
405. Id. at 187.
406. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNiNGTHE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILYIN NINETEENTHCENTU AmEmcA xi-xii (1986).
407. For a discussion of how biological relationships affect the welfare system, in
particular TANF, see Anne Marie Smith, The SexualRegulationDimensionof Contemporary
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002).
408. See infra Part I.
409. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 407, at 143-44; see also Fontana, supra note 202, at 36977 (delineating the history of the cooperation requirement).
410. Smith, supra note 407, at 143-44.
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fueled more by political than economic factors.4 11 In contrast to the
slow growth of the prosperous postwar 1950s, the increases in the
welfare rolls accelerated significantly in the 1960s.412 The
characteristics of families on welfare were also changing-f many of the
additional families receiving public assistance were concentrated in
five heavily populated urban counties. 3 At the same time, black
families began to overtake the predominantly white families that
characterized the program in the beginning.4' 4
In their famous expose, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A.
Cloward attributed this striking increase to political influences
rather than to any economic downturn, the purported attractiveness of
increased benefit levels, or the supposed crisis in "the Negro
family."' 5 In their view, "expansion of the welfare rolls was a
political response to political disorder. Moreover, it was a matter of
black politics.' 6 The political context of the mid-1960s included the
modernization of Southern agriculture, a great migration of black
families to the cities, the creation of a political base there, and
unprecedented rioting and civil disorder. 1 The National Welfare
Rights Organization created a militant grassroots movement of the
poor that challenged the multitude of harassing welfare regulations
and restrictions.4 18 They were aided in this effort by community
activists and professionals for whom the Great Society's local
programs created opportunities and leverage to help people get the
relief to which they were entitled.419
Legal decisions, no doubt, also contributed to this trend. For
example, in 1968 and 1970, the Supreme Court declared that
"substitute father," man-in-the-home restrictions had no statutory
authorization. 42 0 The Court also declared that state residency
requirements for receiving assistance violated the right to travel

411. FRANcES Fox PIVEN & RICHARDA. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 198 (2d ed. 1993).
412. In the 1950s, public assistance rolls increased by seventeen percent, but between
December 1960 and February 1969, 800,000 additional families swelled the rolls, an increase
of 107% in little more than eight years. Id. at 183.
413. Id. at 185.
414. Id. at 193-94.
415. id. at 189.
416. Id. at 198.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 320-30.
419. Id.; see also William E. Forbath, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights:A History, Critique,
and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1850-55 (2001) (describing NWRO and the
welfare rights movement).
420. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968).
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and were unconstitutional.4 2 ' In addition, by the early 1960s,
scholars, practitioners, and activists had laid the legal groundwork
for procedural due process protections for recipients of public
assistance. In two famous articles, Professor Charles Reich
promulgated his theory of the 'new property' in government
entitlements of various kinds.422 Legal services attorneys and the
National Welfare Rights Organization led a campaign which
culminated with the 1970 ruling that "when welfare is
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides
the recipient with procedural due process." The Goldberg ruling, in
turn, created a veritable cottage industry of 'fair hearings' at which
AFDC beneficiaries could represent themselves or be represented
by legal aid attorneys or welfare rights organizers.42
As the economy faltered in the 1970s, however, and the political
environment and the personnel on the Court changed,42 a
conservative backlash gathered force.426 On one hand, the 1970s
was the time of the "newer equal protection" 27 when the Court
afforded more recognition to the rights of nonmarital children and

421. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
422. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Charles A. Reich,
IndividualRights andSocial Welfare: The EmergingLegal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
423. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970).
424. See Jesse H. Choper, Consequences ofSupreme CourtDecisionsUpholdingIndividual
ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 148 n. 1073 (1984) (noting an increase in requests
for hearings after Goldberg);see also The Supreme Court, 1969 Term: Right to HearingBefore
Terminationof Welfare Payments, 84 HARV. L. REV, 100 (1970) (analyzing Goldberg);Henry
J. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (discussing the due process
explosion since Goldberg); Project, Procedural Due Process and the Welfare Recipient: A
Statistical Study of AFDC Fair Hearings in Wisconsin, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 145, 160-69
(analyzing the impact of Goldberg on fair hearings).
425. Warren Burger became Chief Justice in 1969; Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist took the bench in the early 1970s; Justice Stevens joined in 1975; and Justice
O'Connor joined in 1981, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, at
http'Jtwww.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
426. Joanna Brenner argues that welfare policy in the period of the early 1970s was at a
'stalemate': economic pressure on corporate profits led to attacks on the bloated bureaucracy
and to state-based taxpayer revolts; while this put a halt to any expansion in welfare, liberal
interests and an "organized social welfare lobby" could only temporarily contain the attacks.
Johanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 99, 115 (1989).
427. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972) (coining the term).
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nonmarital parents. 42 On the other hand, it was also a predecessor
period of so-called 'welfare reform.' The 1974 amendments to the
Social Security Act were "explicitly sold on the basis of reducing
Among other provisions, the
welfare costs and caseloads."
legislation required mothers on AFDC to 'cooperate' in establishing
paternity for their nonmarital children.'
With the election of Ronald Reagan and the advent of a
Republican Congress in 1980, AFDC came under heightened attack,
and the interest in paternity establishment grew correspondingly."'
The 1988 Family Support Act required states to establish paternity
in "a certain percentage of cases of children receiving AFDC or child
support services" and provided federal funds to pay ninety percent
of the cost of paternity establishment." 2 By 1986, according to
the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Gilliard, more than 1.5 million
paternity establishments were achieved, with 3.5 million child
support orders and $6.8 billion worth of collections "on behalf of
children in AFDC families."'3 3
In 1996, Congress enacted a major departure in federal welfare
policy' designed in the words of President Clinton to "end welfare
428. See, e.g., N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (holding that a New
Jersey public assistance program, which confined benefits to children in households with
ceremonially married parents and therefore denied benefits to nonmarital children, violated
the Equal Protection Clause). Justice Rehnquist dissented from the per curiam opinion on
the grounds that it was rational for the New Jersey legislature to target certain kinds of
family units that it was trying to protect. Id. at 621-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
429. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children:
The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.& Soc. CHANGE 457, 510
(1987-1988). The 1974 amendments "required the federal government to pay seventy-five
percent of the costs of establishing paternity, locating absent fathers, and collecting child
support" and "authorized the use of IRS data to aid in collecting support for AFDC
recipients." Id.
430. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 2359 (1975);
see also S. REP. No. 93-1356, at 52 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8155
(establishing cooperation requirement for AFDC eligibility).
431. See Brenner, supra note 426, at 116 (noting that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981 (OBRA) succeeded in cutting the welfare rolls by eight percent in just one year).
432. Handler, supra note 429, at 510; see Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485,
102 Stat. 2343, 2348-50 (1988).
433. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603 n.19 (1987). This does not necessarily mean that
children benefitted. InBowen, for example, the Supreme Court approved an "income deeming
rule" for the family filing unit which netted many families less income than if they had
not requested benefits for the children whose fathers were voluntarily paying child support.
Id. at 594. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Court declined to permit individuals to use the
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce benefits under Title IV-D. 117 U.S. 329,348
(1997). Taken together, these cases protected the interests of the state, but not those of
poor children.
434. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000))
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as we know it."35 Paternity establishment was a critical element of
this reform, which one commentator described as moving all states
toward "a common set of paternity establishment protocols,"36
"through a combination
of substantive requirements and financial
3 7
penalties/incentives."4

Section III of PRWORA is designed to promote male
responsibility through more effective establishment of legal
paternity, entering of child support orders, and tougher enforcement
of those orders." s Establishment of paternity is touted as a critical
link to alleviating child poverty through child support orders. 9
Under PRWORA, states are required to have an in-hospital
'voluntary' paternity establishment procedure which has the force
of a legal adjudication.'"3 Paul Legler believes that this requirement
reflects the reality that the time to strike while the iron is hot is at
the birth itself, when many unmarried fathers are still involved in

[hereinafter PRWORAI. The Ninth Circuit described the significance of the changes as
follows:
PRWORA signaled a major shift in welfare law and policy, jettisoning the old
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program in favor of TANF
.... TANF was intended to increase the flexibility of States in operating
welfare programs by shifting administration of welfare benefits almost entirely
from the federal government to the states.
Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 325 F.3d 1133,1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003). "In
order to receive funds under TANF, states must submit a plan and apply for block grants
....In other words, TANF is simply a pass-through program that funnels federal money to
states for state-run welfare programs."Id. at 1135 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-03).
435. Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States In New Role, N.Y. TIMES,
August 23, 1996, at Al. The 1996 law replaced AFDC with TANF and devolved the federal
program into block grants, which the states could run more flexibly. Operation of these
grants is subject to the broad purposes of the Act, including work programs and a time
limitation on welfare payments. Id. Peter Edelman, a key advisor in Clinton's Department
of Health and Human Services (and husband of Marian Wright Edelman of the Children's
Defense Fund), resigned after Clinton signed off on the largely conservative-fashioned and
much-criticized (in liberal circles) welfare bill. See Brendon O'Connor, The Protagonistsand
Ideas Behind the PersonalResponsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliationAct of 1996
The Enactment of a Conservative Welfare System, 28 SOC. JUST. 4, 6-7 (2001) (reporting on
interviews with protagonists of the welfare reform battle).
436. Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: The Case for Passage of the New Uniform
ParentageAct, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41, 46 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts, Biology andBeyond].
437. Id.
438. See PRWORA, supra note 434, § Il.
439. See Paul K Legler, The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Child Support Enforcement
System, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 46,47 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S.
Melli eds., 2000). Legler is the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at 58. He characterizes
PRWORA's child support approach as a revolution that includes an "increased focus" on
paternity establishment. Id. at 57. He anticipates striking results, including more child
support orders, better enforcement, and ultimately "soarling]" collections. Id.
440. 42 U.S.C. § 666(aX5XC) (2002).
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a relationship with the mother."' In addition to this voluntary
program, states must have simple administrative procedures for
ordering genetic testing." 2 States are required to have procedures
for paternity establishment up to age eighteen, and the federal
government picks up a significant percentage of the laboratory and
other costs of the procedure."' The longstanding requirement that
mothers 'cooperate' in identifying nonmarital fathers continues,
with the states having more flexibility to define 'cooperation,' but
Non-cooperation with paternity
only in a stricter sense.'
establishment carries an even bigger price tag than before: welfare
recipients (read: women) who do not cooperate with the state in
establishing paternity lose at least twenty-five percent of their
(read: their children's) monthly cash assistance."" A state's success
in paternity establishment directly affects the 'incentive' funding it
gets from the federal government." 6
Paternity establishment has long been a feature of efforts to
control welfare costs. In PRWORA, this strategy plays an enhanced
role that, along with other reforms, carries the conservative hopes
and dreams that the welfare problem will go away by privatizing
the problem and by removing people in need from visibility. Thus,
in evaluating the 'success' of the 1996 change, supporters point with
pride to paternity statistics: the Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE) reported that "paternity was established or
acknowledged for over 1.5 million children in fiscal year 2002, a
3.2% decrease from fiscal year 2001.""" Of this number, 46% were
441. See Legler, supra note 439, at 47-48.
442. Id. at 48-49. There is a presumption ofpaternity based on genetic test results. Id. at 49.
443. Id. at 48-49; see also PRWORA, supra note 434.
444. See, e.g., Mark Matthew Graham, Domestic Violence Victims and Welfare 'Reform:
The Family Violence Option in Illinois, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 433, 450 (2002); Fontana,
supra note 202, at 374-80 (describing the problems created when domestic violence is present
and a waiver of cooperation for good cause is requested).
445. Legler, supra note 439, at 49.
446. The incentive formula is a complex one which also involves other factors. The Child
Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645 (1998),
reformed federal incentive payments for an effective child support program by requiring a
performance-based incentive system.
447. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Child Support Enforcement (CSE) FY 2002
Preliminary Data Report (April 29, 2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
cse/pubsa2003/reports/prelimdatareportl [hereinafter CSE Report]. Hearing on Child
SupportEnforcement LegislationBefore the United States Senate Comm. On Finance,107th
Cong. 3 (2003) (testimony of Marilyn Ray Smith, Deputy Commissioner and IV-D Dir., Child
Support Enforcement Div., Massachusetts Dep't of Revenue), availableat http-//finance.
senate.gov/hearingstestimony/2003test/0312O3mstest.pdf [hereinafter Smith Testimony].
There has been a similar increase in paternity establishments nationwide. In 1994,
states established paternity for just 659,000 children. Each year since 1999, states have
established paternity for approximately 1.6 million children per year. As states work through
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Title IV-D (public assistance) "legal paternity establishments," and
around 55% were in-hospital or other similar paternity
The OCSE reported that the increase in
acknowledgments.'
paternities established was "largely due to the in-hospital paternity
acknowledgment program." 9 Paternity establishment is supposed
to yield enhanced child support collections, presumably for the
benefit of children.' That assumption is questionable at best. The
OCSE reported that of the accumulated $90 billion worth of arrears
in child support, about half of the debt submitted for enforcement
is owed to state governments to reimburse prior welfare costs; only
the other half is owed to families. 1 Even this figure has to be
evaluated in light of another fact: "about 2/3 of the debt and about
52
2/3 of the people who owe it earned less than $10,000 last year."
In other words, much of this debt is realistically uncollectible and
will bring no benefit to poor children.
Although paternity establishment clearly is driven by welfare
concerns, its proponents also insist that it is about more than mere
money. In testimony before Congress about the reauthorization of
PRWORA, a director of Massachusetts' welfare program claimed
that "the heart follows the money," that is, fathers who pay support
"are more likely to make an emotional commitment to their
children." By that rationale, in-hospital paternity establishment
and "effective child support enforcement" yield a relationship as
well as a monetary payoff.'
the backlog of establishing paternity for older children, however, this number is likely to
decline in the future, making it difiult for states to maintain paternity establishment rates
ofnnety percent - the current standard. Since 1994, states have helped more than ten million
children make a binding legal connection with their fathers. Id.
448. See CSE Report, supranote 447. Although the Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) reported that the distribution of its services is changing in general, the strong
welfare tie still exists. The OSCE bragged that "the child support enforcement program is
becoming less a revenue stream to reimburse governments for welfare expenditures, and
more a source of income for families," to the tune of 89% of the collections in 2002. Id. The
"largest group" of the clients they served, or 46%, were "welfare leavers," relying on those
payments to "prevent them from becoming welfare 'returners.'Id. In other words, to the
extent that the program helps those not actually on welfare, it is still directed toward the
near-poor, those teetering on the edge, or those just recently ejected from the public
assistance rolls. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Smith Testimony, supra note 447, at 7.This connection was important to the Deputy
Commissioner because she believed that 'there is no longer any debate that responsible
father involvement has a significant positive impact on child well-being." Id.
454. The data on the correlation between payment of support and relationship measures
such as visitation has been mixed in general. See Judith A. Seltzer, Child Supportand Child
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It is clear that child support enforcement, and, therefore, the
interest in paternity establishment, are closely tied to public fisc
concerns about welfare recipients, welfare "leavers," or those on the
edge. Paternity establishment lies at the conjunction of concerns
about the public fisc, the notion that children's welfare should be
ensured chiefly through the mechanism of the private family, and
the idea that, for the purpose of financial responsibility, family is
defined by biology alone.4" The quick establishment of a paternal
relationship has the primary effect of fixing financial responsibility
within a normative private family with a father who supports his
children, and the secondary effect of mooting any relationship
issues between these fathers and children. Once a father, always a
father, for all purposes.
B. The UnmarriedFather'sOpportunityInterest in Developing a
PersonalRelationship:"Biology Plus"After Lehr
i. Contemporary Context: The Supreme Court Declines to
Get Involved
In contrast to the clear direction of public policy on paternity
establishment, since Lehr v. Robertson, 6 the Supreme Court has
yet to fill in the contours of 'biology plus' and the opportunity
interest acknowledged in that case. This has left state courts and
legislatures (and the Uniform Commissioners) with the job of
defining an unmarried father's 'right' to seize the opportunity
created by biology and transform it into something more. In
particular, it is unclear what should happen when the facts are
outside of the status quo paradigm, including stepfather adoptions
where children continue to live with their biological mothers. What
happens when the biological mother instead chooses to surrender
her parental interests to a proposed new private family, which

Access: Experiences of Divorced and NonmaritalFamilies, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT
FRONTIER 69,70-72 (J. Thomas Oldham &Marygold S. Melli eds., 2000). The Massachusetts
Deputy Commissioner also testified that her own state's experience had shown that while
fathers are often 'romantically involved" with mothers at the time of the birth of their nonmarital children, they tend to "drift away" later. Smith Testimony, supra note 447, at 7. This
observation underscores the advice to strike while the iron is hot. See Legler, supra note 439,
at 47.
455. See PRWORA, supra note 434.
456. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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comes complete with new mother and new father? What kind of
notice is due the putative father, under which circumstances can he
withhold his consent and block the adoption, and with what result?
In Lehr, a case involving a stepfather adoption, the Court
approved the failure to provide notice of a pending adoption to a
man who had not entered his name in New York's putative father
registry.45 7 The majority characterized him as a reluctant father
who had not stepped forward to grasp the opportunity presented by
biology.45 Thus, another man could replace him without his
consent, reaffirming a unitary family without his participation.4 59
The dissenters in Lehr believed that Mr. Lehr was not a reluctant
father at all, but rather a thwarted father deprived of his
opportunity to turn biology into 'biology plus,' thereby creating a
constitutional right to withhold consent.' Subsequent to Lehr, and
after two infamous failed adoption cases in the early 1990s and the
promulgation of the Uniform Adoption Act in 1994,461 putative
father registries spread. These registries served as a mechanism for
separating the wheat from the chaff, the reluctant from the
thwarted, mere biology from 'biology plus.' Moreover, they were
endorsed by the 2000 version of the Uniform Parentage Act.482 At
least twenty-eight states have some form of a putative father
registry that provides notice to registrants and an opportunity to be
heard in court. In contrast, men who fail to register or perform any
of the specified parenting behaviors do not receive these procedural
protections.463

457. Id. at 264.
458. See id. at 267-68.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 269, 274 (White, J., dissenting).
461. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.LA. 11 (1994).
462. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 401-23, 9B U.L.A. 295, 321-27 (2000) (last amended or
revised in 2002), available at http:/www.aaml.org/Artices/2000-11/UPA%20FINAL%20
TEXT%20WITH%20COMMENTS%20.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) convened in 1997 to draft
the 2000 version of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). Roberts, Biology andBeyond, supra
note 436, at 43. The new UPA subsumes and replaces the previous Uniform Putative and
Unknown Fathers Act of 1988 and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
of 1988. Id. The UPA also contains all provisions necessary to be 'eligible for federal funding
for their child support and TANF programs." Id. Roberts reported that the 2000 UPA version
was endorsed by leading organizations such as the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, the National Child Support
Enforcement Association, the Eastern Regional Interstate Child Support Association, the
Academy of American Adoption Attorneys, and the Organization of Parents Through
Surrogacy. Id. at 44.
463. Id. at 43 n.5, 72-73.
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In 1988, around the same time that the Court was considering
the Michael H. case,' it also heard oral arguments in a California
adoption case.' This dispute involved the ultimately unsuccessful
efforts of an unmarried father, who claimed to be thwarted in his
parenting efforts, to block the adoption of his child by strangers.'"
In the end, the Court avoided the potential equal protection and due
process issues, dismissing the case "for want of a properly presented
federal question."' 7 In the 1990s, the Supreme Court again avoided
getting involved: it refused to intervene in two highly publicized
failed adoption cases, the "Baby Jessica"" and "Baby Richard"
controversies. In both cases, thwarted unwed fathers successfully
claimed parentage and custody of children who had spent the first
few years of their lives in adoptive homes. The facts of the "Baby
Jessica" case were disputed, and neither party's hands were
entirely clean. 7 ° The little girl's dilemma became a focus of media
attention, ending with her on the cover of Newsweek Magazine.'
She became a veritable poster girl for the conflict between birth
parents and the fathers' rights movement versus adoptive parents
and children's rights advocates. 72 The Iowa Supreme Court (where
464. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
465. McNamara v. City of San Diego Dep't of Soc. Serv., 488 U.S. 152 (1988).
466. In re Baby Girl M., 688 P.2d 918 (Cal. 1984) (in bank), affd, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Cal.
App. 4th Dist. 1987), dismissed sub nom. McNamara v. City of San Diego Dep't of Soc. Serv.,
488 U.S. 152 (1988). The California Supreme Court's remand to the trial court was based on
state law. See In re Baby Girl M., 688 P.2d 918 (Cal. 1984) (in bank). On remand, the trial
court considered itself precluded from addressing the constitutional issues. In re Baby Girl
M., 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 663 n.2 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1987). But see id. at 667-70 (Work, J.,
concurring) (discussing constitutional issues raised in Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed FathersBefore and After Lehr u. Robertson,45 OHIo ST. L.J. 313 (1984)).
467. McNamara, 488 U.S. at 152. Appellants questioned whether it violated equal
protection "to terminate the parental rights of an unwed father who promptly manifested a
significant parental interest in his child and would be a good parent" solely on the grounds
of "best interests of the child," and without any finding adverse to his parenting skills (in
contrast to other fathers or unwed mothers). Brief for Appellant, McNamara v. City of San
Diego Dep't of Soc. Serv., 1988 WL 1026144 (1988). Appellee questioned, inter alia, whether
the Court even had jurisdiction when, it alleged, the California Supreme Court had
"remandled the case to the trial court on state law issues only," and the Appellant had
waited to raise constitutional claims until too late in the appellate process. Brief of Appellee,
McNamara v. City of San Diego Dep't of Soc. Serv., 1988 WL 1026151 (1988).
468. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
469. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 994; habeasgranted,In
re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995).
470. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
471. Michele Ingrassia &Karen Springer, She's Not Baby JessicaAnymore, 1 NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 21, 1994, at 60.
472. "Baby Girl Clausen" was born to a twenty-eight year old unmarried woman named
Cara Clausen who agreed to place the child for private adoption with a Michigan couple,
Roberta and Jan DeBoer. Cara named Scott Seefeldt as the father of her baby, and both of
them relinquished their rights in an Iowa court proceeding. See In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502
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the child was born) ruled that Daniel Schmidt, whom the mother
had failed to properly identify on the baby's birth certificate, was
the biological father, that he had not consented to the adoption, that
he was not shown to be unfit, and that he was entitled to physical
custody of his daughter."' The adoptive family, however, went to
court in Michigan, where they resided with the girl.4 7 ' Once the
Michigan Supreme Court determined that Iowa had exclusive
jurisdiction under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), the battle was over.475 The United States Supreme Court
refused to issue a stay of the Michigan jurisdictional order, 76 and
custody of the now two-and-a-half year old girl the Schmidts called
"Anna""' was physically transferred to them in a very dramatic
and public episode. 78
"Baby Richard," also known as Danny, was the second child in
a two year period whose failed adoption attended by "wrenching
factual circumstances ... arrived on [the] doorstep" of the United

N.W.2d 649,652 (1993). Although the DeBoers took the girl back to their home in Michigan,
adoption proceedings were halted in Iowa after Cara reneged on her identification of Scott and
claimed that Dan Schmidt was actually the child's biological father. (Blood tests later
confirmed a 99.9% probability of Dan Schmidt's paternity). Id.; see Marian L. Faupel, The
"BabyJessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between Children's and Parents'Rights, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 285 (1994) (written by counsel for Dan and Cara Schmidt, the biological
parents); Gregory A. Kelson, In the Best Interest of the Child: What Have We Learnedfrom
Baby Jessica and Baby Richard?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 353 (2000).
473. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
474. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
475. Id. at 652.
476. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 509 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (application for stay denied on
grounds that the Michigan Supreme Court correctly ruled that it was obligated to give
effect to Iowa orders).
477. Ingrassia & Springer, supra note 471, at 60.
478. Geoffrey Cowley et al., Who's Looking After the Interests of Childrenr,NEwSwEEK,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 54.
The media frenzy frightened families such as my own. During the height of the Baby
Jessica controversy, I asked my pre-teenaged child for an opinion from the perspective of
someone who had been adopted. The conflicting views expressed by someone who could
visualize a personal connection to the situation demonstrate that the thwarted father-failed
adoption conundrum cannot be remedied with simple emotional or legal solutions. My
child was angry that the toddler Jessica was being "thrown around like a sack of potatoes"
and felt that the adults who created the mess deserved to be "shot." Notes of an Interview,
12126/93, on file with author. My child'was upsetwithboth sets ofparents: the birth mother
lied about the identity of the birth father, while the birth father failed to support other
children and threatened the security of the adoptive family by pressing his claim; the
adoptive parents wrongfully obtained premature consent from the birth mother and
insisted on dragging the dispute out for more than two years, even though they were aware
of the misidentification almost immediately. My child felt that none of the adults behaved
properly. It was like the presidential election, a choice between a "liar (Bush), a quitter
(Perot), and a loser (Clinton)." Id.
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States Supreme Court.479 The Court twice declined to intervene to
change the result of the state court proceedings." ° Otakar (Otto)
Kirchner was an unidentified biological father who claimed to have
been deceived and thwarted of his opportunity interest in
developing a relationship with his child.4"' The Illinois Supreme
Court agreed and ruled that Otto could not be deprived of his child
without a showing that he was unfit." 2 After an unseemly dispute
between the judge who wrote the opinion, a columnist in the
Chicago Tribune, and the Governor and state legislature, who
unsuccessfully tried to intervene to change the result, the Court
ordered that the then three-year-old boy be turned over to his
father's custody within seventy-two hours. 4a The United States
Supreme Court denied a stay of this order, although Justices
O'Connor and Breyer dissented from the denial. 4 ' Negotiations
between the families for a gradual transition collapsed, and
"Richard" left his childhood home to become "Danny," amidst a
melee of some 200 shouting neighbors.4
479. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995) (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from denial of stay application).
480. Baby "Richard" v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994 (1994); Doe v. Kirchner, 515 U.S. 1152
(1995). The Court also refused a stay in O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995).
481. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324,326-28 (19951 Although the biological parents lived
together before the birth of the child and had intermittent plans to marry, they had a
troubled relationship and in fact had not married. Id. at 326. While Otto Kirchner was
overseas visiting ill relatives, Daniella Janikova received a phone call that led her to
believe that Otto had married an old girlfriend while he was away. Id. Although Otto denied
this story over the phone, Daniella told him she did not want to see him again, and she
moved out of his apartment and into a women's shelter. Id. She made arrangements for a
private adoption with the Does. Id. The majority and the dissent of the Illinois Supreme
Court disagreed over whether the adopting parents and their lawyer knew that Daniella
intended to lie to Otto and tell him that the baby had died because she believed he would
never consent to the adoption. Id. at 326; id. at 344-45 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). In any
case, Daniella went through with her adoption plans and told Otto that the child had not
survived. Id. at 327. Eventually, after the baby had been living with the adoptive parents,
Otto learned of the deception. Id. He also reconciled with Daniella, who apparently had come
to regret her decision but had no basis to repudiate it on her own behalf. Id. Otto, however,
took his battle to the Illinois courts and won. Id. at 328. See also Steven R. White, "Baby
Richard" FAQ . 1 of 3: Current Events, at http-/www.webcom.com/kmc/adoption/br-faq1.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) (summarizing the facts of the case).
482. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d. at 328. See also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ul. 1994).
483. Mike Robinson, Biological Parents Take Baby Richard, AUSTIN AMEmiCANSTATESMAN, May 1, 1995, at A9.
484. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995).
485. Robinson, supra note 483. The Illinois legislature amended the Adoption Act in
reaction to the case, establishing a Putative Father Registry, a best interests of the child
custody hearing in disputed adoption proceedings, and "a number of fast-track provisions
intended to bring closure to adoption proceedings on an expedited basis." Diane S. Kaplan,
The Baby RichardAmendments and the Law of UnintendedConsequences, 22 CHILD. LEGAL
RTS. J. 2 (2002-2003).
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By staying out of these cases, the United States Supreme Court
left the nation in the dark about the full constitutional dimensions
of the unmarried father's 'opportunity interest,' especially in the
more troublesome circumstances of a newborn adoption that does
not involve stepfather adoption of an older child.8 Moreover,
neither of these disputes involved a putative father registry scheme,
so there is no further guidance beyond Lehr for that issue. Both the
Iowa court and the Illinois court, however, seem to have assumed
that a biological father who proves that he was thwarted and
therefore deprived of his opportunity interest in developing a
relationship consequently may prevail on biology alone.
In the wake of these two high-visibility state court cases in
which mere biology apparently carried the day, the Uniform
Commissioners completed their five-year travail on the Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA), and many states adopted versions of a
putative father registry scheme." 7 The UAA reasserted the
Caban-QuiUoin-Lehr'biologyplus' approach to personal relationships,
even in the context of newborn adoptions that do not allow much of a
look-back period during which to measure the quality of an
unmarried father's relationship to his child.4m The Act reflected its
drafters' conclusion that Lehr and the earlier cases created a
constitutionally sound distinction between notice and consent for
unmarried fathers.' 9 While contending that Lehr's lesson was that
unmarried fathers do not always get notice, the drafters of the UAA
promulgated a model Act that was "generally protective of the
interests of unwed fathers in receiving notice of a proposed adoption. 4 "
486. See Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972)
(vacated and remanded in light of Stanley v. Illinois "with due consideration for the
completion of adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has apparently lived with the
adoptive family for the intervening period of time"). Rothstein involved a putative father who
received no notice of the newborn adoption of his child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's gloss
on Stanley gave that case a broad reading that protected this unmarried father initially.
State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 207 N.W.2d 826, 828-29
(Wis. 1973). The father, however, ultimately lost custody after a fitness hearing and a 'best
interests of the child' determination. State ex tel Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. &
Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Wis. 1975).
487. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 1-8,9 U.L.A. 11 (1994), availableat http-/lwww.law.upenn.
edulbUlulc/fnact99/1990s&uaa94.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter UAA]. See Joan
HeifetzHollinger, The UniformAdoptionAct: Reporter'sRuminations,30FAM. L.Q. 345,35863 (1996); see also Herma Hill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: The UAA, Not the
UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 CAL L. REV. 703 (1996) (providing commentaries on the UAA by
participants and supporters).
488. UAA § 2-404, 9 U.L.A. 53-55 (1994).
489. Id § 2-401 cmt. at 50-51; see also Hollinger, supranote 487, at 358-63 (describing the
due process considerations of birth fathers).
490. UAA § 2-401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 51 (1994).
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This was not so with consent, however, for the right to withhold
consent and veto an adoption, the unmarried biological father
needed to have stepped forward with some kind of parenting
behavior.491 The grounds for ending the relationship with an
unmarried father who asserted parental rights, moreover,
'supplement' the usual statutory bases for terminating recognized
'parental rights.' 92 Men who fail to support women during
pregnancy, according to their means, may have their rights to their
children terminated after birth."' Putative fathers who, without a
compelling reason, fail to support an infant, visit regularly or show
a willingness to assume legal and physical custody of an infant not
living with the biological mother also may lose these rights.49 ' The
UAA even provides for terminating the relationship with a
'thwarted father,' under the right set of circumstances.49 5 If a court
finds that there was a compelling reason for the lack of a prior
relationship, it nonetheless may terminate if there are "risks of
substantial harm" or an "actual detriment" to the child's interests
by not severing the relationship. 49 Thus, the interests of a faultless
father might have to yield to the competing interests of a child
97
whose life would be significantly disrupted by any change in custody.
Recent state attempts to resolve the right of unmarried fathers
to block adoptions may be likened to 'search and destroy missions.'
With the occasional exception, most state court opinions have
tended to enforce strictly the time requirements to file in a putative
father registry, even for a man who claims to have been 'thwarted'
in his efforts to locate the biological mother and his child.
Legislatures and courts are requiring 'parenting' behavior, even if
that is defined only by attempts to take financial responsibility. In
other words, after the somewhat shocking results in the "Baby
Jessica" and "Baby Richard" cases there seems to be a general effort
to enforce 'biology plus,' even in the newborn adoption situation.
By describing the philosophy as 'search and destroy,' this
article does not mean to suggest it is intrinsically the wrong
approach. It was difficult to find, in any of the cases, an explicit
reference to the "child's sense of time" concept promoted in the
1970s by Freud, Goldstein, and Solnit.493 Implicitly, however, the
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Id.
Id. § 3-504
Id. § 3-504
Id. § 3-504
Id. § 3-504
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.

cmt. at 87.
at 85-89.
emt. at 88-89.
at 85-89.

498. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40 (1979).
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horrified response to adoptions that come undone after an infant
has spent his or her young life in an adoptive family rests on an
appreciation of this principle. Furthermore, some of the statutory
schemes distinguish between children under six months of age and
those over that age in their 'search and destroy' provisions."'
Perhaps this is based more on a desire to free' very young 'adoptable'
children for adoption as quickly as possible,O° but it is also
consonant with a child's sense of time. Long, dragged-out disputes
surely are not in a child's best interest, especially a very young
child.s"l Situations in which a biological mother has decided that the
adoption choice is in her child's best interest, but the biological father
wants to block the adoption without assuming full custodial
responsibility for raising his child, are particularly unappealing.
Perhaps it is understandable that as an adoptive parent I am a bit
defensive about 'pop-up pops' who appear late in the game and
upset the new family's life. Finality and stability are very important
to children, and the problem is not entirely susceptible to a 'rights'
approach. On the other hand, as a former due process lawyer and
someone who appreciates that the parent-child relationship should not
depend on the marital status of the parents, I have a real conflict.

499. See, e.g., UAA § 3-504, 9 U.L.A. 85-89 (discussing different requirements for children
over and under six months of age).
500. The drive to release so-called'adoptable' children as soon as possible may also reflect
an unsavory view of the adoption market, which now reaches overseas as well; cf In re
L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex. 2003) (refusing to allow revocation of voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights of the unwed mother and father in the face of claims of
undue influence and fraud of young, Spanish-speaking biological parents). The majority
justified their decision in part on concerns about competition from overseas adoptions:
"Injecting any greater uncertainty and complexity into the process would only serve to
discourage potential adoptive parents, who are already turning to simpler and less expensive
foreign adoptions in record numbers.' Id. The dissent, by contrast, found this to be a
"bizarre" argument and blamed the "excruciatingly slow course" of this case in large part on
the court's own delay of 524 days. Id. at 730-31 (Hecht, J., joined by Jefferson, J., dissenting).
501. This statement does not address or take a position on the distinct issue of family
reunification versus permanence planning for children in the foster care system due to
absence, neglect, or their parents' inability to take care of them. In 1980, the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a, "created a program in
which the federal government reimburses states for certain expenses incurred in the
administration of state foster care and adoptive services. To qualify for these funds, states
are required to make 'reasonable efforts' to reunify childrenwith their parents.' In re M.D.R.,
124 S.W.3d 469, 475-76 (Mo. 2004) (decision not yet final) (explaining federal law). The
Missouri Supreme Court recently opined that the 1980 statute led to unreasonable delays
and children being stuck in foster care limbo. Id. at 476. As a result, "Congress passed the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (Pub. L. 105-89) (codified as amended in
various sections of 42 U.S.C.)," which specified a period of fifteen months in foster care after
which state agencies had to move to terminate parental rights and seek permanent
placement elsewhere, or else risk losing federal funds. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XE)).
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In the end, perhaps at least some of the answers lie in intermediate
resolutions for ambiguous problems. Those answers, however,
largely lie beyond the scope of the present article.
ii. The Thwarted Fatherin State Court: Some
Recent Examples
The 'biology plus' mantra of Lehr has been a standard in recent
state high court cases. These cases go beyond the stepfather
adoptions encompassed by the Supreme Court rulings to date,
delving into relatively uncharted territory. The chief disagreements
seem to be over (i) how strictly to construe time requirements in
putative father registry or other statutes; and (ii) how to evaluate
the 'plus' that is required of a thwarted father. In other words,
when has a man delayed too long to claim rights as a putative
father; and when has he been improperly thwarted of his
constitutionally protected opportunity interest? Needless to say, the
evaluation of the unmarried man's 'plus' behavior is a value laden
factual question that sometimes provokes dissenting opinions from
judges who see situations quite differently.
The significance of a putative father's delay in asserting his
interest was canvassed in 1996 by the South Dakota Supreme
Court. In Baby Boy K,"02 the putative father missed a sixty day
statutory deadline after the birth of his child to "affirmatively
asser[t] paternity."5 3 Without satisfying that proviso, he was not
entitled to notice of any adoption, dependency, delinquency, or
termination of parental rights proceeding.5"' The alleged father
claimed that he was unaware of the mother's pregnancy. He
claimed that he was also unaware of the child's birth until one
month after it occurred. 5 He filed a paternity action after another
two months had elapsed.5" The question the court resolved was
"whether W.B.L. timely asserted his opportunity interest so as to
trigger greater due process protections than were afforded to him
under South Dakota law."" 7 In other words, even if the putative
father missed the statutory deadline, he might still have a
constitutional right to be heard. The court emphasized that when
it comes to children, time is of the essence:
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

In re Baby Boy K, 546 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1996).
Id. at 90 (citing 2003 S.D. Law 25-6-1).

Id.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 97.
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Children are not static objects. They grow and develop... A child's
need for permanence and stability, like his or her other needs,
cannot be postponed. It must be provided early. That need for
early assurance of permanence and stability is an essential factor
in the constitutional determination ofwhether to protect a parent's
relationship with his or her child. The basis for constitutional
protection is missing if the parent seeking it does not take on the
parental responsibilities timely. The opportunity is fleeting. If
it is not, or cannot, be grasped in time, it will be lost.'

Although it observed that the United States Supreme Court
"has not articulated a time frame for an unmarried father to assert

an opportunity interest in his newborn child," the South Dakota
court read Lehr's "grasp the opportunity" language to require

prompt action.5" It also found support for this view in the
framework of the UAA and the decisions of other state legislatures
and courts.5 1

In the end, the putative father's other behavior

entered into the court's evaluation as well."' By contrast to other
cases, W.B.L. showed no interest during the period of the
pregnancy; he had a very short sexual relationship with the mother;
and he did not even take action until more than two months after
he learned of the child's birth.512 So whatever deception the mother
may have practiced, he did not meet his burden to inquire and to
act. Indeed, by the time the child was three months old and already
in an adoptive home, "the State's fully matured interest in
the putative
protecting the child's permanent home" 51outweighed
3

father's claim of the mother's dishonesty.
Similarly, an Iowa putative father lost his entitlement to notice
and the opportunity to block a Minnesota adoption when he missed
the thirty-day deadline to file in that state's Fathers' Adoption

508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 97-98 (citing UAA § 3-504, 9 U.L.A. 85-89 (favoring the biological father's
interest only in the first six months of the child's life)); see also Robert O. v. Russell K, 604
N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992) (favoring an unwed father who asserts his rights during the first
six months of his child's life); In re Adoption of Hudnall, 594 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Ohio 1991)
(upholding an even shorter time frame in a state statute that permitted only thirty days to
assert the putative father's interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13 (1995) (requiring that a
putative father's assertion of rights must occur either prior to the mother's relinquishment of
the child to a licensed child placement agency or before the filing of a petition for adoption).
511. Baby Boy K, 546 N.W.2d at 99-100.
512. Id. at 100.
513. Id. at 101. Justice Sabers was satisfied because there had been notice by publication,
which satisfied due process. Id. at 102 (Sabers, J., concurring in part and concurring in
result in part).
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Registry by one day. l4 He argued that he was excused from exact
compliance because of fraud on the mother's part and because of
"substantial compliance" with the statute."' 5 The majority found no
fraud and rejected the notion that the mother's failure to let him
know where she was (in a state where he knew she had relatives)
could be treated as such.5" 6 The court "decline[d] to impose a
fiduciary duty" on the biological mother to inform a putative father
of her location, in view of the man's ability to use the registry
without any help from her. 17 The Justices observed that they were
unaware of any other court which imposed such a fiduciary duty. 18
Moreover, as the court noted:
There are numerous situations in which an unmarried birth
mother would be justified in keeping information from a putative
father, including situations where the woman has fled an
abusive relationship, where the pregnancy was the result of
nonconsensual intercourse, or where the putative father poses
a danger to the child.51'
The Minnesota court emphasized the importance of timeliness to
the child's future and noted that the legislature had amended the law
to shorten the time frame after concluding that an earlier statute
which was more generous to putative fathers "jeopardiz[ed] the
state's interest in permanence and stability in adoptions."2 0
Turning to the constitutional argument that the putative father had
satisfied the 'biology plus' standard, the court concluded that the
facts did not support such a finding. 21 The majority found that
there was no established relationship between the unwed father
and child and that the father had not made an effort to support the
therefore, the court found this case
mother during the pregnancy;
5 22
indistinguishable from Lehr.

514. Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2002). The putative father, who was
an Iowa resident, registered in the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry (where the child
was born) one day after the thirty day deadline and then started a paternity action to stop
the adoption. Id. at 362.
515. Id. at 362, 369.
516. Id. at 367-68.
517. Id. at 368.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 364.
521. Id. at 372.
522. Id. at 373-74.
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Justice Page's dissent displayed a different take on the
behavior of the mother as well as that of the putative father1 2' The
eighteen year old mother hid from the nineteen year old putative
father in the later months of the pregnancy and had promised him
earlier that she would never consider adoption, which he opposed.'
The young couple even tried living together for a while, but it did
not work out.5 25 The putative father consulted an Iowa attorney
about child support payments prior to the birth but did not worry
about adoption because the lawyer told him that under Iowa law he
had to consent." The dissent would excuse the fact that the
putative father failed to register in Iowa or another relevant state
because it would not have helped him in27any case; Minnesota law
required his entry into its own registry.
The dissent concluded, from its reading of the facts, both that
compliance should have been excused under the statute and that
due process demanded a different result." In Justice Page's eyes,
the putative father had made a "full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood"' because he clearly told the mother
that he would not support abortion or adoption and that he would
give her a "lot of support for having the child."' 30 The dissent opined
that the majority's disregard for the importance of the biological
father's contribution to a child's development led it into "arrogance"
stemming from "its hostility to putative fathers generally, and to
this father specifically."5 ' Whatever the truth of the dissent's
sentiment, however, the majority's strict enforcement of the
with putative fathers are
timeliness requirement and impatience
53 2
not unusual in other state court cases.
523. Id. at 377-78 (Page, J., dissenting).
524. Id. at 377 (Page, J., dissenting).
525. Id. After they separated, the young woman kept in touch with her former boyfriend
by electronic mail, but she refused to reveal where she was. Id.
526. Id. at 378.
527. Id. at 380.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. ld. at 381.
531. Id. at 383 n.5.
532. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d 1192, 1198 (N.H. 2002) (determining that an
incarcerated putative father who failed to register before the mother voluntarily relinquished
her rights did not satisfy any of the statutory alternatives; therefore, he was not entitled to
notice of the adoption, regardless of any improper actions on the part of the mother in falsely
stating that she did not know where he was. He also had waived any constitutional
arguments). But see id. at 1202 (Dalianis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that the majority misinterpreted the statute and the putative father had a
constitutionally protected interest pursuant to Lehr). See also Osborne v. Adoption Ctr. of
Choice, 70 P.3d 58, 65 (Utah 2003) (holding that a putative father who actually spent some
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The discussion in the South Dakota court, and the differences
between the majority and the dissenters on the Minnesota Supreme
Court, demonstrate that the 'biology plus' standard can be highly
subjective. Moreover, it is clear that there may be competing values
at play: a strong priority on timeliness and permanence for the
child versus the idea that the biological father has much to
contribute and has been unfairly shut out of his child's life. The
biological mother's actions also become an issue, which is a peculiar
application of the 'rights' approach to a more complex problem.
While the mother's fraud or refusal to accept assistance may bolster
the claim of a putative father to having been thwarted of his
opportunity interest, it has very little to do with the welfare of the
child. Moreover, when a nineteen year old young man promises an
eighteen year old young woman 'support,' what is he really saying?
By blocking adoption, is he not trying to force her to raise the child,
with some assistance from him? That is hardly the same as taking
full parental responsibility upon himself.
Sometimes the failure to search properly leads to a failure to
destroy the putative father's protected opportunity interest,
especially if a court feels there is any fraud or baby-selling involved.
In Baby Boy W.,"' the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, holding that the thwarted putative father had been
deprived of his 'parental opportunity interest' and thus, his due
process rights, after the biological mother had placed their child for
time living with his child is not entitled to notice or consent because he failed to take the
necessary timely steps required by the registry). But see id at 72 (Durham, C.J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the putative father registry strictures may be applied to a developed
relationship). See also In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256 (Neb. 2001). Because
he filed in the wrong court, the putative father failed to comply with Nebraska's statute,
NED. REV. STAT. § 43-104.05 (1998), which requires a putative father to file a petition for
adjudication of paternity within thirty days of filing notice of intent to claim paternity in
order to preserve his rights to notice of an adoption hearing. Id at 260. The Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld the statute in the face of equal protection and due process challenges
by a man they viewed as having no established relationship with the child, although the
putative father had complied with the first part of the statute by filing notice of intent
within five days but had failed to follow up with a timely petition for adjudication of
paternity. Id. at 263-64. Thus, there was no need for his consent under state law. rd. at 264.
The Nebraska court held that the thirty day filing requirement did not facially violate
substantive due process or the equal protection clause. Id. at 264-65. The court explained
that the provisions for treating biological mothers and fathers differently were justified and
substantially related to the important state interest of the speedy determination of
placement for children. Id at 265. Moreover, the father lacked an established relationship
with his child that would trigger due process protection. Id. Cf Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d
740 (Neb. 1996) (upholding the five day notice provision when the biological parents engaged
in on-and-off discussions about what course of action to follow, but the father had no
established relationship with the child and was ignorant of the statutory requirement).
533. In re Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1999).
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adoption through an agency.5 ' Oklahoma law then provided for a
preadoption "Section 29.1 hearing," to be held when a nonmarital
mother relinquished her parental rights." 5 The statute required
notice of the hearing to any putative father, at which the court, "if
it is in the best interest of the child,"' could "accept a relinquishment
or consent... executed by the father or putative father of the child,
or... determine that the consent... is not required or [t]erminate
the parental rights of the father or putative father, ... or... grant
custody of the child" to that man. 7 A man who could show that he
was in fact a thwarted father enjoyed a defense to termination on
the grounds of failure to exercise parental rights and duties.6 8 He
also had to show that he tried to find out if he had fathered a child
and that he tried to exercise his rights and duties."'
By contrast to the cases discussed above, in which courts were
very unsympathetic to putative fathers regardless of the mother's
conduct, the Baby Boy W. court took a stiffer line with what it
interpreted as the misconduct of the adoption agency.' When the
mother failed to identify the father even though she had engaged in
an extensive sexual relationship with him and knew his
whereabouts even afterwards, and the adoption agency compounded
this default by failing to notify him in a timely manner even after
she relented and told them his name, the majority found a due
process violation. 4' The agency's misconduct was particularly
blatant: it filed an affidavit for notice by publication identifying the
putative father as 'Jody last name unknown,' even after it actually
knew his identity. 4 2 The court was livid in responding to this
egregious behavior: hese actions of the Agency at best demonstrate
a lack of due diligence and candor. At worst, they indicate
complicity in Natural Mother's denial of Natural Father's right to

534. Id. at 1272.
535. Id. at 1273. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 29. I(FX 1) (Supp. 1996) (outlining the provision
of a pre-adoption hearing). The action was brought a few days before the provision was
revised by a new Adoption Code, which became effective Nov. 1, 1997. OKLA STAT. tit. 10, §
7505-2.1 (Supp. 1997) (retaining the hearing with more particularized conditions). Cf.
Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992) (discussing the California hearing that
establishes the constitutional standing of a putative father).
536. Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d at 1273.
537. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 29.1 (Supp. 1996) (repealedby OKLA. STAT. tit.10,
§ 7505-2.1 (Supp. 1997))).
538. Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d at 1274.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
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notice of the distinct possibility that he had fathered a child. " S
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court was particularly angry
about the adoption agency's duplicity, it also emphasized that
during the relationship the father claimed to have expressed a
desire to parent any child should the mother become pregnant and
remarked that after his treatment for testicular cancer the
likelihood of that happening was very slim.'" Furthermore, the
father had responded promptly upon receipt of actual notice.6 "
Even though the Oklahoma court conceded that the father also
knew the location of the mother, had left her a birthday message on
her voice mail, and had never tried to find out if she was pregnant,
those facts apparently paled in significance beside the deceitful
actions of the mother and the agency.'
In a private adoption with no agency involvement, the
Louisiana Supreme Court similarly seems to have been very
concerned with the strong overtone of gross misbehavior, in this
case baby-selling, on the part of the biological mother.M7 Quite a bit
of money changed hands, pocketed by either the mother or the man
she had initially deliberately misidentified as the father of the
child.' Under these circumstances, the putative father fared better
than in some other timeliness cases, considering he actually knew
about the birth but failed to respond within the statutory period
after receiving a defective 'notice.'" 9 The notice given was
ineffective because it failed to comply strictly with the service of
process rule and to contain all the advisements specified by law.5"
Citing the sentiments of Lehr about the unique opportunity afforded
a biological father, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the failure to
give the exact notice required to be fatal."5 '
The Louisiana Supreme Court also credited the putative
father's showing of "commitment to parental responsibilities and
fitness to assume legal and physical care" of the child.5 52 The
biological father was a former gang member who had been arrested
for breaking down the maternal grandfather's front door to stop the
543. Id.
544. Id. at 1271.
545. Id. at 1272.
546. Id. at 1271. By the date of the appeal decision, the child was nearly two years old and
had been living with prospective adopting parents while being visited by the biological father.
Id. at 1272.
547. In re A.J.F., 764 So.2d 47, 52 (La. 2000).
548. Id. at 49.
549. Id. at 57.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 57-58.
552. Id. at 61.
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mother from having an abortion.' There was disputed testimony
about his relationship with his other two children. 5 4 The mother
clearly had troubled relationships with the men in her life, leaving
the putative father during her pregnancy, resuming a liaison with
another man who previously had fathered a child by her, then
leaving the second man briefly to come back to the putative father
after an incident of domestic violence, and finally returning to the
second man and living with him through the birth of the child in
question.5 The other man falsely swore to be the father of the child
and may have benefitted financially from payments by the
adoptive parent."s
Despite the questions raised by testimony, the trial court
concluded that the putative father met the requisite standards for
commitment and fitness. 7 He provided food, clothing and shelter
to the mother for the time she lived with him in the first part of the
pregnancy, prepared a baby's room in his home and maintained
contact with the mother's grandmother to stay informed about the
pregnancy.55 8 The lower court believed that he did not approach
the mother directly while she was living with the other man
559
because he feared that doing so could put her in physical danger.
Immediately upon learning of the child's birth, the putative father
went to a lawyer.5 ° By contrast, the mother seemed to thwart his
"ability to establish his commitment to his parental responsibilities" 1
at every turn, and she "fraudulently surrendered [the child] to the
prospective adoptive parent. 56 2 Despite his former gang affiliation
and allegations of substance abuse, the juvenile court also found the
putative father to be willing and fit to assume custody of his
child." Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly
endorsed the juvenile court's emphasis on the mother's deceit and
the $4000 payment that went to the mother and her boyfriend (and
co-participant in the fraud).' With all this evidence, given that the
standard for reversal on appeal was 'manifest error,' the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 49.

Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.

2004]

PARADOX OF UNMARRIED FATHERS AND THE CONSTITUTION

117

court's decision allowing the father's objection to the adoption and
granting him custody. 565
While these examples do not summarize everything that is
happening in state courts, they give a sense of the attitudes toward
allegedly thwarted putative fathers and what is seen as the
misbehavior of mothers and others in those situations. While babyselling and fraud on the court are not behaviors that should be
rewarded, many of the other circumstances of these cases are quite
ambiguous. Although Lehr and the grasp-the-opportunity line is
always invoked, these cases in which putative fathers prevailed do
not seem to provide much concrete guidance on what it takes to
establish the 'plus' of the 'biology plus' standard by a thwarted
father. At least when it comes to the threshold issue of who is the
'father' with protected rights to withhold consent, the analysis is
also always unitary. Even more than in the stepfather adoptions,
these situations entail a complete substitution of one private family
for another, i.e., substituting the birth mother and a birth father
with rights with a new legally constructed mother and father.'
There is no consideration of the possibility of multiple parental
relationships, such as allowing a thwarted putative father to
participate to some lesser degree in his child's life while not
disturbing the adoption.
V: CONCLUSION: WHAT MAKES A MAN A FATHER?

What makes a man a father in a constitutional sense? The
United States Supreme Court seems to answer that question by
saying, "it depends." In some cases biology alone and in others
'biology plus' is required. Since the mid-1970s, biology alone usually
satisfies the constitutional test, where there are benefits to give out
and where those emoluments cost the state money or something
565. Id. at 62. The case was actually remanded, because by operation of Louisiana law, if
the father successfully contests the adoption, then the mother's otherwise irrevocable
surrender is dissolved. Id While conceding that the United States Supreme Court had never

decided the issue, the concurring opinion questioned whether Article 1138 of the Louisiana
Children's Code would survive equal protection analysis, because it distinguished between
unwed mothers who could automatically withhold consent, and unwed fathers who had to
prove their fitness. Id. at 62-63 (Victory, J., concurring). In light of constitutional
developments, the concurrence believed that an unwed father should be presumed fit. Id. at
63-64. See also Petrosky v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1995) (holding, in a contest
between the putative father and maternal grandmother for custody and legitimization,
that the father's "fundamental interest in parenting" precludes depriving him ofcustody on
a best interest standard).
566. See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 406 (giving a history of the legal construction
of the adoptive family in the nineteenth century).
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else of value. It is apparently not permissible to give either the
indigent father or the indigent mother a choice in this matter.
Involuntary paternity establishment, with the coerced 'cooperation' of
the mother, is permissible. Even if paternity establishment is a
waste of state resources, a futile attempt to 'get blood out of a
stone,'6 7 the state may proceed with it. In fact, in order to keep its

Title IV-D funding, the state must do this.'

According to this

approach, there is but one family structure, normatively private,
and it requires a single financially responsible father. If he balks at
that responsibility, then the state can thrust it upon him based

simply upon proof of his biological paternity.
On the other hand, a biological father's personal relationship
to his child may turn on whether a 'biology plus' standard has been
satisfied, especially where there is another man prepared to take up
financial responsibility in his stead. After Lehr, line-drawing is
necessary to determine just how much 'plus' is enough to ripen the
inchoate claims of an unmarried father into mature rights to notice,

a hearing, and the ability to withhold consent to the adoption of his
child by another man. What should we make of this apparent
paradox of paternity? In particular, how does the distinction apply
to the putative father who claims to have been thwarted and
deprived of his 'opportunity interest' to develop a relationship with his

newborn child? The Court has provided little or no guidance for Lehr
line-drawing in this context.
567. Absent fathers are often too poor to contribute to their children's support. See, e.g.,
Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking About Custody and Support in Ambiguous-FatherFamilies,36
FAM. L.Q. 49, 69-70 (2002) (noting that "researchers have estimated that thirty percent of
the nonpaying fathers of nonmarital children are 'poor' or 'near-poor,' citing Irwin Garfinkel
et al. A Patchwork Portrait of Nonresident Fathers," in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE
REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPpiRT ENFORcEMENT 31,51 (Irwin Garfinkel et al., eds., 1998)); see
also Paul K. Legler, The ComingRevolution in Child SupportPolicy:Implicationsof the 1996
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 562 n.222 (1996) (citing study suggesting that absent parents
of children on welfare are so poor that even if a child support order is established and
enforced, the TANF caseload would be reduced by only eleven percent); Handler, supra note
429, at 512 (citing a study that showed between 1973 and 1984 the average annual income
for men in the twenty to twenty-four year old age bracket, especially for young black men,
had actually fallen in real terms); Smith, supra note 407, at 140-41 nn.76-80 (citing David
L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2594-95 (1995) (noting that many absent fathers of
children on AFDC are poor)).
568. With increased devolution to the states, legislatures have a choice and can refuse to
implement the mandatory paternity identification and cooperation rule, but at the cost of the
federal government withholding five percent of the total TANF funds. See PRWORA, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 409, 110 Stat. 2105, 2143 (1996); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, § 5506, Ill Stat. 251,614-15. No state has decided to refuse this part of the program,
even though, based on past federal history, it is unlikely that sanctions would ever be
imposed. Smith, supra note 407, at 146.
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Biological determinism should be rejected as a model where it
is used by the state to justify coercing'cooperation' from women and
private responsibility from men who cannot afford it. Thus,
although the newer equal protection cases of the 1970s, which
expanded the ability of nonmarital children to sue their fathers for
child support, generally were well reasoned, all was not well even
then. While these cases looked like disputes within private families,
after 1975, they often were publicly instigated. It is true that Gomez
v. Perez,"9 which struck down a Texas statute barring nonmarital
children from suing for child support, was decided in 1973 before
enactment of the coercive amendments to the Social Security Act.
The next case in this line, however, was a suit by a mother
receiving AFDC who had to assign her rights to the state and
'cooperate' in paternity establishment in order to retain those
benefits."' The Court then struck down a distinction in the time
allotted for filing a suit to establish paternity and seek child
support between children who received public assistance and those
who did not.57 1 By 1988, when Clark v. Jeter 72 was decided,
invalidating shorter time limits to file for child support, its issue
was a moot point. Congress had just amended the SSA to require all
states, on pain of losing their Title IV-D (AFDC) funding, to extend
the time to file for child support from nonmarital fathers to the
child's eighteenth birthday.573 Therefore, even though Clark was
correctly decided in its rejection of discrimination against
nonmarital children, it was superceded by a congressional statute
which reflected concern primarily for the public fisc.
In Little v. Streater, the Court ruled that the state had to
ensure the accuracy of paternity findings, even if it meant paying
for the costs of blood tests sought by indigent fathers.57 4 This ruling
reflected the Court's acknowledgment that biological determinism was
driving Connecticut's statutory scheme. Notwithstanding that
concern, in Rivera v. Minnich, the Court held that it was perfectly
acceptable to impose this relationship for a lifetime based solely on
a mere preponderance of evidence of the biological tie.5 78 Saving the
public fisc was so important, in fact, that the Court ruled in Bowen
v. Gilliard that the state could even devise rules which had the
569. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
570. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
571. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
572. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
573. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 42
U.S.C § 666.
574. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
575. 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
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effect of injuring a substantive parental relationship between a man
and his child.5 7' Thus, even though Sherrod's father was driven
away by the income sharing rules, the Court was not concerned.577
Finally, fixed on an image of the Johnny-Appleseed American
servicemen populating the world with children who might claim
American citizenship, the Court upheld differential biological
determinism as it applied to fathers and to mothers in Nguyen v.
I.N.S."'8 Although I would not disagree with the decision in Little v.
Streater, and maybe not even with the decision in Rivera, the
decisions in Bowen and Nguyen are particularly disturbing. The
former was just another nail in the coffin of forced 'cooperation' for
mothers who must choose between assigning their rights and
feeding their children, 57 9 and the latter approved the deportation of
a man whose American father had actually raised him from infancy.'
Biological determinism should also be rejected where it is used
to remove real fathers, who have a personal relationship, from the
lives of their children. On the other side of the paternity paradox,
the Court in Michael H. approved the excision of a biological father
from his child's life,581 but mostly the Court has left us with
unanswered line-drawing questions. 'Biology plus' is entirely a legal
construct. For the married father, the 'plus' is satisfied
automatically by being married to the mother." 2 Even though the
states have long since abandoned Lord Mansfield's rulem and now
permit denial of the husband's paternity, they are still
constitutionally free to limit who may make this claim. My criticism
of the Michael H. case is not that the Court should have embraced
biological determinism; rather, it is that the Court permitted
California to ignore a man's desire to continue contact with his
daughter, with whom he shared a personal relationship as well as
576. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
577. Id. at 621-24 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
578. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
579. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
580. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53.
581. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
582. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (2000)
§§ 204, 9B U.L.A. 311-12 (delineating the presumption of paternity), 303, 9B U.L.A. 315
(denyingpaternity when a child has a presumed father), and 607, 9B U.L.A. 341-42 (limiting
the time for denial of paternity for a child with a presumed father); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT (1973) §§ 4, 9B U.L-A. 393-94 (presuming fatherhood) and 6, 9B U.L.A. 410-11 (denying
paternity of a presumed father).
583. See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777) (holding by Lord Mansfield
that "the declarations of a father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue born
after marriage"); see also Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex 1975) (noting the
"widespread denunciation of the Rule").
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a biological link.' Rejecting the Stanley-Lehr test of 'biology plus,'
the Court instead upheld the primacy of marriage, or what they
called the 'unitary family.'5 5 This was an act of legal fiction as there
was no unitary family in this situation. In reality, the child already
called both men "Daddy."'
Aside from Michael H.'s strange adhesion to old fashioned
common law doctrines, the Court has, for the most part, not defined
'biology plus' line-drawing after Lehr. In Lehr, the Justices gave
their approval to the 'search and destroy' methodology of the
putative father registry. 7 While not free from due process
difficulties, in light of the importance of time in an infant's life,
such an approach may be necessary in the newborn adoption
context. However, just how much and what kind of 'plus' merits
notice and a hearing, and triggers the right to consent or withhold
consent to an adoption, is not clear, especially in the case of the
thwarted father. What is clear is that in circumstances where the
father has been deprived of his opportunity to develop a
relationship, the 'plus' must be satisfied in some other way. State
court cases demonstrate concerns about how hard thwarted fathers
try to become a part of their children's lives, as well as the
misbehavior of mothers and third parties who defrauded fathers of
their opportunity interests and the courts of the right to hear all
relevant evidence. These two concerns imply two principles: first,
that 'biology' counts, and second, that 'justice' counts. How much
and how do they count? Biology counts because it potentially gives
rise to individual rights in the father,just as it gives rise to public
rights againstthe father.Justice also counts for the same reason recognition of individualrights that are unfairly stymied.
Consider a different approach, one built on social claims rather
than on individual rights. When I first started thinking about
'failed' adoptions, I studied an extreme example to see if it could
cast any light on the problem in general.5" Families in Argentina
were raising children as their own who had actually been
kidnapped from parents murdered by the dictatorship of 19761983."9 Some of the 'adoptive' families were relatively innocent of
the horrors of the regime; others were quite complicit. 5" An
584. Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
585. Id. at 123.
586. Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
587. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-65.
588. See Laura Oren, Righting Child Custody Wrongs: The Children of the 'Disappeared"
in Argentina, 14 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 123 (2001).
589. Id. at 123.
590. Id. at 128.
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organization called the Abuelas (or "Grandmothers") spent many
years tracking down the children of their murdered sons and
daughters and trying to reclaim them in some fashion.59 1 Biology
and justice both counted in this situation, but in a social context,
rather than an individual rights context. In order to receive an
order for blood tests of a child they believed was an offspring of the
'disappeared' living wrongfully with 'adoptive' parents, the Abuelas
had to establish a kind of probable cause.5" I argued that "the
social predicate for this probable cause was created by the
revelations" about the human rights violations of the dictatorship
and the kidnapping that took place under its aegis. 93 Moreover, in
each individual case, probable cause to intrude upon an established
family by demanding blood tests was satisfied by "the meticulous
accumulation of pictures and reports gathered from informants and
from their own observations" which made it more likely than not
that this particular child was a child of 'disappeared' parents. 9 4
Rather than presenting an 'individual rights' claim on behalf of the
families of the 'disappeared,' the Abuelas made a social (and
political) claim on behalf of the children.5 95 Concededly, theAbuelas
wanted "strict and pure justice" for their murdered children and
kidnapped grandchildren. 5" As I have argued, however, they also
operated on the basis of a definition of "best interest of the child"
that was "grounded in Argentine social reality and was about the
children's right 'to their name, to their heritage, to their
identities.""59 It was evident that in the "context of the wrenching
and murderous secrets and lies of the nightmare years [of the
dictatorship]," the Abuelas felt that the best interest of the children
would be served by a healing truth.'5 g
Depending on their assessment of the relative guilt of the
'adoptive' parents, the Abuelas helped negotiate a variety of custody
solutions to problems of wrongful adoptions.5m Although transitions
could be very dramatic and painful, the Abuelas' psychological team
tried to pay attention to each child's needs during the transfer

591. Id. at 129.
592. Id. at 143.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 186.
596. Id.
597. Id. (quoting James F. Smith, Sought by Argentina; Children of "Dirty War". Sad
Legacy, LA. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1988, Part I, at 1).
598. Id.
599. Id. at 150.
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between one household and the other.' The social context for these
faulty adoptions was as bad as it could be: the dictatorship had a
deliberate plan to kidnap and raise the children of the 'disappeared'
(those murdered by that junta) in a social environment hostile to
the values of their biological parents."° Even so, where there were
mitigating factors (an 'adoptive' parent who participated in fraud
but not murder; an older child; no biological kin available), the
individual solutions might be more nuanced.'
Interestingly, the United States has its own version of a finding
of a social predicate for a justice approach to faulty adoptions.
Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), °
based on findings that a social context existed in which "wholesale
removal of Indian children from their homes . . . [was] the most
tragic aspect of Indian life today.' ° Testimony before Congress
indicated that non-Indian child welfare workers did not understand
the family structure and the importance of extended family to the
children and to tribal life.' 5 Consequently, the jurisdictional heart
of the reforms in the statute required decisions about children
domiciled on reservations to be made in tribal rather than state
courts.6 As a result, the Court did not hesitate to invalidate an
adoption of twin babies placed for adoption with both parents'
consent but outside of tribal court's jurisdiction."°7 The Court noted
that three years had elapsed while the children lived with their
adoptive parents, a time period which clearly made a difference in
the lives of the children.s However, the Justices eschewed any
responsibility for deciding where the children should live, because
the tribe properly had objected to the deliberate bypass of the tribal
court and was, therefore, entitled to make this determination. °
The claims of justice, of not rewarding those who deliberately
600. Id. at 162.
601. Id. at 186.
602. Id.
603. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963).
604. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (quoting
Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Sen.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of William Bykr)). A
Texas court characterized the congressional findings in even stronger terms: this was a
statute designed to "ensure the continued viability of Indian tribes by protecting Indian
children from cultural genocide."Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tex.
App. 1995).
605. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 35 n.4.
606. See id. at 42.
607. Id. at 53.
608. Id.
609. Id.
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evaded the mandate of the ICWA in order to obtain custody and
maintain it during this litigation, prevailed in the United States
Supreme Court. The Court then passed the ultimate decision back
to the tribal court with a wish and a prayer: "It is not ours to say
whether the trauma that might result from removing these children
from their adoptive family should outweigh the interest of the Tribe
-

and perhaps the children themselves

-

in having them raised as

part of the Choctaw community."6 0 Rather, the Court invoked, and
deferred to, "the experience, wisdom, and compassion of the
[Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion an appropriate remedy." 11
The Holyfield case produced two instructive sequelae. After
transfer, the tribal court decided that it was in the children's best
interest to leave them in place with the adoptive parents." 2 The
tribal court also required continuous contact between the twins and
their extended family, as well as with the tribe itself.61 3 In other
words, just as in the Argentinean situation, there was a nuanced
solution to a complicated situation. At the same time, the United
States Supreme Court decision, an endorsement of the justice
approach that was not universally well received, became what may
and compelled demands for
be called a 'flashpoint' of controversy
614
amendment of the ICWA itself.
Clearly, social context counts in the United States, too. What
is the social context of adoptions involving thwarted nonmarital
fathers? These are not cases of murder and kidnapping by brutal
minions of a military regime dedicated to wiping out the origins and
identities of the children, nor are they cases in which Congress has
declared its concern about wholesale cultural genocide. Rather,
these are cases in which a biological mother, either by accident or
by design, fails to identify or misidentifies the biological father of
her child when making an adoption plan. The wrong is that this
misidentification deprives the thwarted father of a limited
individual right, an opportunity interest that the United States
Supreme Court recognized in opinions starting with Stanley and
culminating with Lehr. The improper identification may be
motivated by one of a variety of reasons - a lack of the mother's
relationship with the biological father, her desire to make things
610. Id. at 54.
611. Id. (quoting In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)).
612. PreparedStatement of Thomas L. Leclaire, Director of Tribal Justice, Before the
Senate Committee on IndianAffairs and the House Committee on Resources, FEDERAL NEWS
SERvIcE, June 18, 1997.
613. Id.
614. See Barbara Ann Atwood, FlashpointsUnderthe Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward
a New Understandingof State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 588 n.5 (2002).
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simpler at a traumatic time in her life, or her wish not to involve a
biological father with whom she has a troubled relationship. In the
Oklahoma Baby Boy W. and Louisiana AJ.F. cases, darker motives
and worse behavior were at play: in Baby Boy W., an adoption
agency knowingly connived to misrepresent the father's identity to
the court, even after the mother had provided it with accurate
information; 16 in A.J.F., the mother seemed to be involved in a
baby-selling scheme with the man she deliberately misidentified as
the father of her child. 6 6 The wrong is also a loss of procedural
regularity in a legal system which rightfully values this attribute
but recognizes a sliding scale to determine what process is due." 7
Thus, while Lehr permits a state to cut off an unmarried father's
opportunity interest through a truncated procedure such as a
putative father registry, the Court in Santosky required much more to
terminate fully developed parental rights." 8
The contemplation of these wrongs raises the questions of
where the child is in the equation and what the child has lost in the
thwarted father situation. Because this country still has sealed
adoptions, 619 in one sense a child loses his or her identity when, in
contrast to a stepparent adoption, an entirely new legal family is
substituted for the birth family. Unless open adoption is
constitutionally required,620 that substitution is permissible if done
lawfully. The child also loses the opportunity to be raised by
biological kin in situations in which the biological father is
615. 988 P.2d 1270.
616. 764 So.2d 47.
617. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 456 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (explaining that clear and
convincing evidence is the process that is due for termination of parental rights); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining a calculus for figuring out what process is due).
618. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
619. See, e.g., E. Wayne Carp,Adoption,Blood Kinship,Stigma, and theAdoptionReform
Movement: A HistoricalPerspective, 36 LAW & Soc REV. 433 (2002) (reviewing KATARINA
WEGAR, ADOpTION, IDENTITY, AND KINSHIP: THE DEBATE OVER SEALED BrTH RECORDS(1997)
(giving the history and current status of sealed adoption record disputes)).
620. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution:The
Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 153 (1999) (reviewing history of
closed adoption records in the U.S., "focusing on the post-World War H shift from
confidentiality to secrecy," the "constitutional law challenges brought initially by adult
adoptees to the sealing of records, and, more recently, the challenges of birth parents to
efforts to open records"). Calm and Singer propose presumptive open records for adult
adoptees (but no right to unconsented contact with birth parents). Id. Today, Alaska, Oregon,
Tennessee and Kansas allow access to original birth certificates upon request. Id. at 167.
Other states are more controlled. Calm & Singer also discuss the due process privacy
counter-challenges of birth parents and the argument about "adoptees' identity interests,"
finding current constitutional doctrine inadequate to address identity issues. Id. at 190. See
also Alma Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting adult adoptees' claims that
their 'personhood' entitled them to open birth records).
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interested in doing the raising himself. On the other hand, if all he
wants is to stop the adoption and 'support' a mother who has
already decided that she should not raise the child, then there is
another issue entirely. Should there be any constitutional
protection for a father's interest in throwing a spanner into the
works without undertaking a timely and full personal commitment?
In the case of the thwarted father, state court cases suggest
that 'biology plus' really means 'biology plus justice.' Up to a point,
this is understandable. It would be a poor legal system that
routinely rewarded misbehavior designed to deliberately evade
constitutional requirements of procedural fairness. It would be a
poor legal system that routinely denied any significance to the
biological tie between parents and children, regardless of the
marital status of those parents. This is, however, an imperfect
world in which imperfect solutions may have to be found. In the
absence of overwhelming issues ofjustice, the constitutional questions
and answers should be more child-centered. There is no evidence of
an epidemic of evil in which committed fathers are deliberately and
routinely being thwarted of the opportunity to raise their children (and
children correspondingly being deprived of their identity and link
to biological kin). 2 1 Indeed, the social policy is quite the contrary.
Because social policy focuses on concerns about the public fisc and
the presumed virtues of the marital family, federal and state
legislation coerces identification of fathers or attempts to 'strike
while the iron is hot,' procuring in-hospital acknowledgments of
paternity, which have the force of law. Thus, I would argue that no
social predicate justifies wholesale upsetting of newborn adoptions,
even of the children of allegedly thwarted fathers.
This leads to two conclusions about the 'plus' standard as
applied to the thwarted putative father who has no developed
relationship with his child. First, in order to qualify to withhold
consent to an adoption, he must demonstrate a timely willingness
to assume full responsibility for raising his child himself. Second,
even if he so demonstrates, the character and origin of the
'misbehavior' that thwarted his ability to develop a relationship
must count. The legal system rightfully should be more concerned
with deliberate evasions of notice and hearing requirements by
adoption agencies (or adoptive parents) and with baby-selling than
with the biological mother's private choices. Further, in light of the
effect on a child of the passage of time, the 'solution' to a faulty
621. Congress has declared the deprivation of tribal identity a serious matter in the ICWA.
See supra notes 603-14 and accompanying text.
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adoption procured without the necessary consent of a thwarted
putative father (but also without gross misbehavior on the part of
the adopting family) might be an open adoption. Thus, the child's
name622 and home would not be disrupted, while the child's identity
and link to biological kin would be preserved.
As an adoptive parent who was not involved in an open
adoption, this solution makes me nervous. Nonetheless, it seems a
positive answer to a faulty adoption, one that transcends parental
rights and focuses on the interests of the child. For those who desire
an individual rights rather than a social framework for solving the
problem of the thwarted father, the child should be the one with the
individual right to security within the adoptive family and to the
knowledge of and link to a biological parent. Of course, this
arrangement requires maturity and effort by both sets of parents,
one that perhaps may be enforced by the equivalent of the so-called
'friendly parent' presumption.62 Families in this situation should
also be entitled to receive any necessary counseling services.
Thwarted putative fathers of newborns by definition lack a
relationship with their children, which creates difficulties for the
due process liberty interest analysis discussed above. Equal
protection anomalies also arise. In Caban, another stepfather
adoption, the Court struck down on its face a New York statute that
gave an unmarried mother an absolute right to veto the adoption of
her child, while it denied that same right to an unmarried father,
regardless of his relationship to the child."2 ' Mr. Caban's children
were four and six years old at the time of the adoption
proceedings. 6" He had lived with them as a family unit and
continued to be a part of their lives even after he and their mother

622. Name changes for three-year old children (such as those endured by Baby
Jessica/Anna and Baby Richard/Danny) are troublesome. In each of these cases, when the
biological father received parental and custody rights, he instantly imposed a new first name
(and surname, of course) on the child. This was as much a denial of identity as any improper
suppression of the biological connection. See Acevedo v. Burley, 994 P.2d 389, 391 (Alaska
1999) ("We appreciate that the consistent use of a single name is important to the child's
emotional development").
623. In custody law, the Triendly parent' is the parent who does not withhold access from
the other parent or discourage the relationship. Presumptions in favor of awarding custody
to the 'friendly parent' have been criticized in the context of women who seek to protect
themselves from their spouse's domestic violence, thereby seeming to be uncooperative. See,
e.g., Nina W. Tarr, Civil Ordersfor Protection:Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L.
& PoL1Y 157, 171 (2003). The manipulation of the Triendly parent' pose could be a problem
in failed adoptions too. I am suggesting, therefore, that it be the basis for adjustments in the
relationships, and not for transfers of custody.
624. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394 (1979).
625. Id. at 389.
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separated and she married another man.626 The Court rejected "the
claim that the broad, gender-based distinction of [the statute] is
required by any universal difference between maternal
and
6 27
paternal relations at every phase of a child's development" and
found that the statute was insufficiently related to the important
purpose of providing adoptive homes for nonmarital children to
survive intermediate scrutiny.628 The majority expressly reserved
the question of newborn adoptions. 2 9
The dissenters, on the other hand, focused on newborn
adoptions and concluded that unmarried mothers and fathers were
not similarly situated during pregnancy and at the birth of the
child." ° Therefore, because of the exigencies of newborn adoptions,
they would have upheld the statute in its entirety, even if it swept
broadly enough to include Mr. Caban's family."' "Men and women
are different," Justice Stevens opined, "and the difference is
relevant to the question whether the mother may be given the
exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child born out of
wedlock. 112 Although both parents were present at the conception
of the child, "from that point on through pregnancy and infancy, the
differences between the male and the female have an important
impact on the child's destiny.'
The dissent continued,
Only the mother carries the child; it is she who has the
constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not. In many
cases, only the mother knows who sired the child, and it will
often be within her power to withhold that fact, and even the
fact of her pregnancy, from that person .... These differences

continue at birth and immediately thereafter. During that
period, the mother and child are together; the mother's identity
is known with certainty. The father, on the other hand, may or
may not be present; his identity may be unknown to the world
and may even be uncertain to the mother .... [A]s a matter of
equal protection analysis, it is perfectly obvious that at the time
and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, differences
between men and women justify some differential treatment of
the mother and father in the adoption process."
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.

Id. at 382.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392 n.11.
Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 404-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The interchange between the majority and the dissent in Caban
demonstrates that the hard questions about adoption and the
differences between unmarried men and women remain undecided.
The Nguyen case, with its apparent endorsement of the sentiments of
the Caban dissent, demonstrates that one can never tell what the
Court might do with biological differences."
For the thwarted putative father, gender-based equal
protection analysis sharpens the paradoxes of paternity. The public
fisc biology cases treat unmarried fathers as mere sources of
financial responsibility. The 'biology plus' cases imply that such
men can be something more than providers, indeed that they must
be something more in order to qualify as a 'parent.' How is a
biological father to establish the 'plus' factor when he has been
thwarted of the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child?
It seems that the most obvious and 'fatherly' way to do that is to
provide financial support, or at least try to do so. The 'resolution' to
the apparent paradox therefore also may rest on the obligation of
fathers to accept financial responsibility for their children.
Although it would be unfortunate, it would not be surprising if the
Court adopted this line as the constitutional minimum that would
satisfy 'biology plus' in the newborn adoption context. As always,
money counts.
Adoption, especially into an entirely new legal family, by its
very nature raises questions about nature and nurture and about
the proper significance afforded biology. The Supreme Court has
addressed these questions in a narrow band of cases that involved
unmarried fathers and stepfather adoptions. It has also considered
a number of paternity establishment and related public fisc cases.
In so doing, it has created an apparent paradox of paternity
wherein biology alone suffices in the latter category, while the
former requires 'biology plus.' The seeming clarity of this dichotomy
disappears quickly, however, when instead of older children who
will stay in place regardless of the decision, infants who will go to
a new home are involved. This is true because there has been no
time for the 'opportunity interest' recognized by the Court to ripen.
The 'plus' factor that the Court requires in relationship cases is
therefore harder to define and establish in this situation. As a
result, outside of the context of an approved putative father
registry, the constitutional fate of the thwarted putative father
remains to be seen.
635. Nguyen v. 1N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).

